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Seanad Special Committee on the Withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union debate -
Thursday, 25 May 2017

Engagement with Professor Christopher McCrudden

I welcome Professor Christopher McCrudden to the final session of a very productive day's work on North-South relations. We are delighted to be able to glean from his expertise and we will have a full engagement after his opening remarks. Before I invite Professor McCrudden to make his opening statement, he might bear with me as I read the notice on privilege. Members are reminded of the long-standing parliamentary practice to the effect that they should not comment on, criticise or make charges against a person outside the Houses or an official either by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable. By virtue of section 17(2)(l) of the Defamation Act 2009, witnesses are protected by absolute privilege in respect of their evidence to this committee. If they are directed by the committee to cease giving evidence in relation to a particular matter and they continue to so do, they are entitled thereafter only to a qualified privilege in respect of their evidence. They are directed that only evidence connected with the subject matter of these proceedings is to be given and they are asked to respect the parliamentary practice to the effect that, where possible, they should not criticise nor make charges against any person, persons or entity by name or in such a way as to make him, her, or it identifiable.

I now invite Professor McCrudden to make his opening remarks.

Professor Christopher McCrudden

I thank the Chairman and Senators. My name is Christopher McCrudden. I am Professor of Human Rights and Equality Law at Queen's University, Belfast and William W. Cook Global Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law School. Until 2011, I was Professor of Human Rights at Oxford University and I am a fellow of the British Academy. I am also a practising barrister at both the London and Belfast bars and in that capacity, I was junior counsel in one of the cases from Northern Ireland that was heard by the UK Supreme Court in December concerning Brexit. If there are any questions on that litigation I will be happy to try to answer them but I will not be discussing that case specifically unless asked to do so.

I thank the Chairman for the invitation to give evidence to this Seanad committee. I am honoured to have been invited. It is my first time and I hope it may not be the last. I congratulate the Chairman on his initiative in holding evidence sessions regarding the implications of Brexit for Northern Ireland. I am conscious as the Chairman said that it has been a busy day. I shall not therefore make a lengthy statement.

I wish to make seven brief points by way of introduction. First, I believed before the referendum - nothing that I have seen since has led me to change my mind - that Brexit is likely to be a disaster for Northern Ireland if the adverse consequences are not substantially mitigated.

I congratulate this committee for holding evidence sessions because it wants to focus precisely on the mitigation of adverse consequences. I now know pretty much what those problems are, not least in areas that affect me personally such as higher education. We are sure to be hit from time to time with the discovery of yet another unintended consequence. At least the broad outlines of what the problems will be are now clear. In broad terms, there is a significant degree of consensus among the parties in Northern Ireland, and between Dublin and London, about the wish list relating to Northern Ireland that should be presented in the forthcoming negotiations. I think that will become even clearer after the general election when the agreement that appeared to be emerging between the major parties in Northern Ireland is published. The basic aim of policy for the future seems to be to preserve as much of the status quo as possible.

There now appears to be broad consensus among the EU 27 - this is also reflected in the British Government's negotiating position - that there are unique circumstances that apply to Northern Ireland. I think the inclusion of this language was a major achievement of Irish diplomacy. It really does not concern me whether the phrase that is used is "special relationship", "special status" or "unique circumstances". I realise that there are political consequences, but I do not think the exact phrase matters all that much in broad terms. The committee will be aware of the important and critical distinction between a special status within the EU and a special status more broadly and not necessarily within the EU. The UK Government appears to have ruled out the first of these options but not the second. Of course, that may change either way.

I suggest we need to move beyond identifying problems, beyond wish lists that seek to preserve the status quo and beyond stressing the unique circumstances of Northern Ireland. We need to begin to develop a detailed plan regarding how to achieve as much as possible of that wish list. I hope the committee will be doing this. Any agreement must be capable of surviving scrutiny by, for example, the European Court of Justice. From what I can see, there is no such agreed plan at the moment. It is not evident in Dublin, Belfast, Brussels, Berlin or London. Not only does there not appear to be an agreed plan in any of the relevant official circles, there does not even appear to be the basic outline of a plan with regard to Northern Ireland, which is worse. The various wish lists that are floating around are just that. I do not think we have the luxury of saying "Sure it will be grand".

I have been working with some of my colleagues at Queen's University - Professor David Phinnemore, Dr. Lee McGowan and Professor Dagmar Schiek - as well as with Mr. John Temple Lang, who is a former Commission official, and Mr. Brian Doherty, a former legal adviser to the Northern Ireland Government, to try to focus minds by producing an outline of a plan. This has now been published as a pamphlet by the European Policy Centre in Brussels. I would be happy to supply a copy to the clerk of the committee for distribution to Senators if they so wish. I hope we can talk more about the detail of this plan. I will provide a broad outline of it.

Our plan would involve Northern Ireland joining a European Economic Area, EEA, agreement together with Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland. This would address some critically important issues: notably, trade in goods and services, membership of the Single Market, free movement of people and the preservation of the single electricity market. The major advantage of the EEA option for Northern Ireland, apart from addressing some of the major substantive issues I have just mentioned, is that it is a known quantity and therefore would not involve a renegotiation of everything that would be necessary to develop a single market, etc. It would not be a panacea. It would not cover the issues of customs, agriculture and fisheries. Essentially, we are suggesting that an EEA+ option, which would supplement the EEA agreement with a series of additional agreements in areas not specifically covered by the EEA, should be adopted. An additional useful aspect of the EEA is that a significant discussion has to take place about the dispute settlement mechanisms to be included in the agreement that will result from the forthcoming negotiations. The UK appears to have set its face against any involvement in the European Court of Justice, at least for now. We will have to see whether that red line is maintained. That seems to be the position. The EEA agreement uses the EFTA dispute settlement mechanisms. The EFTA court, rather than the European Court of Justice, would be involved.

The final point I would like to make is a personal position. I suspect that the major sticking point for any proposal of this kind will be in London, rather than in Brussels. The EEA+ option would meet several of the UK's apparent negotiating red lines. No part of the UK would remain in the EU, would be subject to ever-closer union or would come under the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice after the agreement came into effect. However, it would seem to involve a need for some east-west checks, particularly in terms of the movement of goods and people between the island of Ireland, which would be within a single market, and the rest of the United Kingdom. It would seem to involve some east-west checks while significantly reducing North-South barriers. The UK Government has specifically rejected the proposal that Scotland would join the EEA on the grounds that it would interfere with the UK's single market. Suddenly, the single market appears to be an attractive option, at least within the UK. Unfortunately, there are appears to be a stark choice between North-South checks and east-west checks. This choice will be based not solely on economics but also on questions of identity.

I thank Professor McCrudden for his thoughtful and illuminating address. I invite Senators to ask questions and make remarks.

I thank Professor McCrudden for a very stimulating and challenging contribution. It occurs to me that lawyers are sometimes inclined to look at things as they are rather than as they might be. If a flexible and imaginative solution to Ireland's difficulties were to be found, it could be the subject of a mini-treaty to enable it to go outside the constraints of existing EU law without forming a precedent for other things or requiring the European Court of Justice to go along with it, so to speak. If something is done at treaty level, or even at mini-treaty level in the form of a protocol to be added to the treaties, that is it: the court in Luxembourg more or less has to accept it and live with it as a treaty court. It occurs to me that we should not be too afraid of the European Court of Justice because if there is an appetite for real flexibility, this can be done. I accept that it would involve unanimity, which is never a very happy thing, but it should be doable if there is nothing much to antagonise any of the other 27 member states.

I was interested in what Professor McCrudden had to say about the common travel area. I have been banging a drum at this committee by saying I do not think this is a major problem. I understand that the UK authorities hope to maintain visa-free travel for EU citizens travelling to the UK. The UK intends to put up its defences, so to speak, in areas such as employment, health and welfare, in respect of which there will be all sorts of internal checks.

It will, however, allow any EU national to get on a train from Paris to London without asking him or her to apply for a visa or to pass through a formal immigration control.

What I really want to ask about is goods. Whether the special status is within, subject to or part of the customs union or analogous to being part of the customs unions, the east-west axis is the much easier one to control, subject to certain things. I made the point this morning that one does not have to have a single solution for all areas. Agriculture and agricultural products are one thing while pharmaceuticals and aircraft parts are another. Some things are far more easily monitored in their movements than others. One can have quite a flexible approach which does not involve stopping every truck wherever it crosses whatever line.

I wish to ask Professor McCrudden to elaborate on a couple of matters. What is his sense of the Conservative Party ideology that it wants a homogenous United Kingdom and that anything going down the line of a special status for Northern Ireland is anathema to that basic value? Professor McCrudden drew a distinction which I drew this morning. Special status within the EU would get the Conservative Party's hair standing on end but special status in respect of the EU is a slightly less challenging concept. Can Professor McCrudden comment on those propositions?

I congratulate Professor McCrudden and his group at Queen's University on the first Brexit debate I attended. It was excellently prepared and the contributors were truly wonderful. Certainly, it sent me back home thinking that we were somewhat behind the curve in comparison to where those guys were on that evening.

We had a group in this morning whose members were talking about how Northern Ireland had been disenfranchised with the will of the people not being observed in circumstances where 56% of them voted against Brexit. As a democrat, I hold the view that if one is a citizen of the United Kingdom, it is tough luck if one province happens to go against the majority. Majority rules and that is the bedrock of democracy. Having said that, however, the Good Friday Agreement changed everything. There is no other part of Europe that is covered by an agreement like it. There is no other citizen in Europe who has a right to hold two passports and to claim citizenship of both the Republic and the United Kingdom. Technically, if all 1.8 million people in Northern Ireland decided to apply for Irish passports, where would it leave the United Kingdom's dogged position of no access to the Court of Justice and "We are all in or we are all out"? It is not possible to tell 1.8 million people who have a right to be citizens of the Republic, by virtue of which fact they would be citizens of the European Union also, that one is going to write off their wishes. That runs contrary to my democracy argument that it is tough luck that the United Kingdom, of which the North is part, decided to leave the European Union. We are talking about unique circumstances.

I take on board a great deal of what Senator McDowell said. In coming up with a special solution, a treaty is probably the only way forward. It is something I have just heard for the first time but it seems like an ideal solution. I am interested in those areas of dual citizenship and the notion of whether one can really force one's will on a community which is separate and distinct from the island of England, Scotland and Wales where 56% of them do not want to be part of that decision and are de facto European citizens in any event.

My colleagues will have heard these questions before, but I put them now in terms of Professor McCrudden's presentation and in order to tease the model out from the perspective of agriculture. Professor McCrudden seems to angle towards the east-west model. I will stick with agriculture specifically. If the EU agrees that as part of negotiations Northern Ireland or the island of Ireland will get a special status, beef producing farmers, for example, in the Twenty-six Counties will still be paid up EU members in receipt of CAP payments. There will be no CAP in the North. I cannot see the EU going that far. While it might give the island a special status, I cannot see it funding that. As such, there will be a divide within the agricultural model straight away. If we have an east-west border, will there be tariffs on Northern Ireland beef if there are tariffs on Southern Ireland beef? One then has the element of farmers in the North of Ireland who will dig in their heels and say their beef is British beef. It has come across loud and clear in our deliberations with many groups - such as that which appeared before us this morning - that they would accept a tariff, which would be a better scenario than a division on the island. Almost everyone who has attended - and ourselves - favours a model of special status. If it were achieved in the morning with an east-west border as opposed to a hard border North-South, would we have opened a complete can of worms in terms of working out the logistics of the all-island model?

I welcome our guest. I understand the matter raised by Senator Paul Daly but I am hopeful that Professor McCrudden will say that the difficulties he outlined can be overcome. It is good that Professor McCrudden proposed a model and a solution, which is welcome. How hopeful is he that he can get the model through? Has it gained much traction? While today is an effort in that area, has he done much else to get that into the space and onto the table as an option? At the initial meetings on Brexit in my local authority area at home, the local Oireachtas representatives suggesting that the Norwegian model of relationship with the EU was probably the great hope for the entire UK. How optimistic is Professor McCrudden that we can get what he proposes accepted? How optimistic is he that we can overcome the difficulties raised by Senator Paul Daly? I hope he says that we can. Certainly, as a public representative living in the Border area, I am acutely aware that we have to get an all-island solution to the greatest possible degree.

I share Senator McDowell's optimism around the free movement of persons. That battle is won, albeit we cannot take the victory for granted. Assuming it is won, we need a similar situation in respect of the free movement of goods. The alternative is a nightmare which has been well chronicled in the past number of weeks. I will not go back over that again.

I would like to raise the issue of EEA+ status in respect of Northern Ireland. Theresa May has ruled it out in seeming to opt for the hard Brexit option. I take the point that resistance to that idea would probably come from London rather than from Brussels, although I am not too sure how excited Brussels would be about it, either. It would set a precedent for part of the country remaining and getting the benefits of the EU. Would British companies then establish themselves in Northern Ireland in order to have the best of all worlds? They could be able to trade in the UK and the EU. I am not too sure how that would work in practical terms. The EU has challenged us to come up with solutions that are within current EU law, although those laws can obviously be amended. If Belfast was going to remain in the EEA and also remain in the UK, a London-based company would just establish a subsidiary there, allowing it to do its operations in a sterling area. As we have found out with everything else, there is a caveat to every solution we come up with until eventually we end up back where we started. The mantra from the EU is that Brexit is not going to be a success. Britain's objective is to make it a success but the EU's is for it not to be. Would Northern Ireland remaining in the EEA+ be regarded as a success in some instances? A lot of UK companies and financial houses could transfer to Belfast because they would have access there whereas if they were in Britain they would not have it.

There is also the issue of the European Court of Justice. Everyone is kind of talking around the issue but it is part of our remit here. Our position must be that Ireland needs to be sorted first before the trade element is done. It also must be our position that Northern Ireland remains under the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice, no matter what the British Government or Westminster decides to do in terms of pulling it out of it. While Britain might leave, Northern Ireland should remain. That is part of our negotiating position. In the absence of that, EU citizens in Northern Ireland, of whom there are many hundreds of thousands, would have no access to justice under EU law.

Professor Christopher McCrudden

I thank the Senators for their thoughtful and testing questions. I will go through them sequentially.

Senator McDowell raised four issues. The first was the modalities of how we would reach an agreement, and the structure and form of such an agreement. I tend to agree with him that some form of treaty-based, specific agreement for the island of Ireland and its relations with Northern Ireland and with the EU would be a sensible way forward. I am perhaps less immediately optimistic than the Senator that this would escape consideration by the court of justice, not least because, as he will have seen, in the last few weeks the court of justice has reviewed a trade agreement and has found part of it to be in violation. Prior to that, the court of justice had been mightily exercised about retaining jurisdiction over the interpretation of EU law, which of course would require jurisdiction over any treaty of that kind. I am with the Senator half way, in that I agree it would be a necessary mechanism, but I am not convinced it would escape the court of justice.

Senator McDowell's second point was about the common travel area, which he does not see as a major problem. The common travel area as I understand it dates from about 1923. It has gone through various forms and iterations. Its most recent iteration is a non-legally binding statement that is published, unlike most of the previous common travel area agreements. I am stating the obvious in saying that each of those agreements took place in a context in which both the United Kingdom and Ireland were outside the EU and therefore EU law did not apply, or they were both inside the EU and thus both bound by its law. The unique circumstance is now possibly of the common travel area seeking to operate with one party in the EU and bound by EU rules while the other is not. We do not have a precedent for that.

I am glad that the Senator is optimistic but I am less immediately convinced that the common travel area can resolve the problems, not least because we do not really have a full view of what the complexities of those problems might be. For example, the free movement of persons may or may not be problematic in terms of requiring checks. If there is a substantial hard Brexit view that there has to be a hard Border, that might involve individual checks of everybody crossing that Border into the United Kingdom. We know of course that the common travel area in the past, from 1923, did envisage just those kinds of checks in certain circumstances. Saying that the common travel area is the thing to go for camouflages the fact that in the past, the common travel area has covered a multitude of different types of arrangements. What I am suggesting we should go for is the current iteration of the common travel area. Whether that is consistent with EU law remains to be seen.

I am spending more time on these questions than the Chairman probably wants. The third question from Senator McDowell was about goods and the flexibility that is envisaged in terms of east-west issues. I agree that most of these issues can be negotiated on a tailor-made basis. The problem is not a principled issue but a question of the modalities. The problem is that negotiating everything of this kind from scratch - trade in goods, trade in services, free movement, the common electricity market and so on is the stuff of ten years of negotiations at least. One of the potential benefits of the off-the-peg EEA model is that while it does not cover many of the questions that I will go on to consider like agriculture, it does get some issues off the table, which then allows us to build on a relatively secure basis. There is real tension between getting the ideal solution, as it were, ten years on, and getting something now on which we can build, that at least gets something onto the agenda and securely pinned down. We do not have to renegotiate all the details of the EEA agreement. All of that has been done. It is a known product.

Senator McDowell's fourth point was on the Conservative Party ideology. He will be surprised to hear that I am not in a position to interpret Conservative Party ideology. I will say, although I have promised not to talk about the Brexit case in the British Supreme Court, two things are very apparent in that decision. This is not in respect of the ideology of the Conservative Party but of a much broader constitutional ideology. One is that parliamentary sovereignty rules.

All of the apparent understandings that some of us had that there was a movement beyond parliamentary sovereignty have now collapsed. This has consequences for the future. If we want to shift out of the current constitutional mode in the United Kingdom context, that will have to be absolutely hammered home and we cannot rely on flexibility in that regard.

The second is that the United Kingdom is a unitary state and so the argument that my clients wanted us to put with regard to the idea that there is a constitutional pluralism, as it were, within the United Kingdom went nowhere. It was a unitary state governed by parliamentary sovereignty. This comes back to the point about antipathy to special arrangements. We are undergoing essentially a constitutional negotiation - that is not much of an exaggeration - in the UK. I do not know how well that will go but the position in London is generally that the UK is a unitary state and, therefore, anything that breaches that, particularly if it has economic effects like breaching the so-called single UK market, will be viewed very hostilely.

I thank Senator Craughwell for his comments. I believe the percentage who voted to remain in Northern Ireland was 53%. On the point about democracy, to be theoretical and academic, it depends on what the demos is. The Senator will know as well as I do that what the demos in Northern Ireland is, whether it is part of the United Kingdom is the critical question that divides Northern Ireland. The problem that Brexit has brought to the fore is that the relaxation in notions of national sovereignty and national identity, the sense that there could be shared and different understandings of those issues, is being threatened. Unfortunately, identity, sovereignty and nationality have come rushing back. That is the problem because we return to the question we thought we had resolved with the Good Friday Agreement as to what exactly the demos is in the Northern Irish context.

More generally, in terms of two passports, I must declare an interest as I carry both a British and an Irish passport. I am, therefore, in exactly the position the Senator mentioned. Not only that but I need to declare an interest again as both my children have British and Irish passports, although they were born in Oxford. Where does this leave us? It leaves us in a situation where the position in Northern Ireland is a particular example of the larger negotiations that will have to take place about how the UK treats EU citizens and how the EU treats British citizens, particularly the former. The issue is that it is no longer just a question of how the UK treats Polish plumbers but how it treats 1.5 million people in Northern Ireland who are, as the Senator correctly noted, potentially all EU citizens. This begins to bring a particular dimension to the general problem of how one deals with EU citizens. What this means is that there are two outstanding questions, as has been mentioned, that are in the preliminary part of the negotiations. One of these is Ireland, while the other is the treatment of EU citizens. The EU citizens' point also has an Irish dimension. Notwithstanding whether the penny has fully dropped, the Irish dimension is central to two of the three preliminary questions that must be settled before the negotiations can proceed to trade.

Senator Paul Daly raised the issue of agriculture. The European Economic Area agreement does not cover agriculture. While it covers some of the goods aspects of agriculture, the general issues the Senator raises are not covered. It is clear, therefore, that the EEA agreement would not deal with the issues described. It would not cause an extra problem with regard to such issues, however. In other words, while there would have to be a separate agreement with regard to agriculture, there is no reason this will not be compatible with the EEA agreement. Other states in the EEA have negotiated separate agricultural deals so at least the EEA option does not create more problems in the area of agriculture.

As to whether the agriculture issue is a can of worms, the answer is "Yes" and it would be misleading of me to indicate otherwise. Either last week or the week before, the leader of French farmers expressed some of the opposition to the notion that Northern Ireland could be the route for cheap British food imports into the European Union and they are resisting this for that reason. I fully agree with the Senator that this opens a can of worms. It also raises a funding issue as to how far the British Treasury will provide subventions that will be equivalent to the EU funding that will be lost. As the Senator will be aware, the UK will provide this funding temporarily but there is no guarantee that will be the case subsequently.

Senator Reilly asked how optimistic I was. On a day as beautiful as today, how could one fail to be optimistic? On wetter days in Strangford, as I look out over the harbour, I think it is very difficult in two respects. First, it is not clear that an agreement will be reached, in other words, we may not get past the first three initial issues. Everything seems to change each time I disembark from a flight. I was in Berlin in recent days and I visited London a few days prior to that. As to whether there is general optimism, the answer is "No". As to whether it is more than 50% likely that there will be an agreement on these issues, I am doubtful about that. On that question, the problem is that the outlines of what everybody wants are clear. There should be no hard Border and free movement and a single market on the island of Ireland should continue, etc. The EEA is one of the relatively few ways in which these major objectives can be achieved. It is as simple as that. We have a dilemma, therefore, because some aspects of the EEA agreement will not be palatable. On the other hand, if people want to achieve what they say they want to achieve, this is the way to do it. I apologise as I realise that does not answer the question about optimism.

Senator Reilly also asked what we were doing to sell the idea of the European Economic Agreement. Academics generally are not in the business of selling ideas. We are presenting an idea for consideration in various places. I presented it in various forums in London and I know John Temple Lang has presented it in various forums in Dublin. As I stated, I attended meetings in Berlin in recent days but I have no idea whether the idea is being picked up. It is being talked about and it is coming out in various think tank reports. The Guardian referred to it last week when it noted the idea was on the table. Beyond that, however, I cannot say much.

On Senator Mark Daly's question about how enthusiastic Brussels is, the thrust of the question, which I take as being put in good spirit, is that this creates a problem because Belfast wins. Coming from Belfast, that would be an entirely acceptable result as far as I am concerned.

The European Union does not want anybody in the UK to win.

Professor Christopher McCrudden

I understand that. The problem the Senator identifies is a real one. I would encapsulate it by asking how far the hard economics of this will be tempered in Brussels by a sense of what I can only describe as solidarity with Ireland.

I am afraid I have no idea which is going to win out. If it is purely based on hard economics, each of the points being made by the Senator is entirely valid. We are where are. I did not vote for this and I did not want it. As I stated at the beginning, it is something I would want to reverse if I could but it is not, apparently, going to be reversed. The question is whether, therefore, in light of that Brussels is going to punish the UK and, in doing so, punish Ireland for something for which it was not responsible in the first place. I hope that wiser counsel will prevail that will recognise the need for solidarity in the first place with Ireland, as well as the need to preserve the peace. There is a sense in Brussels that can be picked up that there is a degree of pride that European capitals were involved with underpinning the peace agreement. The last thing I hope Brussels, Berlin or Paris wants is a return to the terrorism in Northern Ireland. I do not want to appear to be sabre-rattling and there is a danger in using the whiff of cordite to try to threaten; that is not what I am doing and I hope I would not be interpreted as doing that. In order to be responsible, one needs to play down these threats although they are a reality. If there are Border posts, the Senators living around there know that in the past, in the 1950s, the Border posts were the target. It was as simple as that. We have photographs to prove that and it is all in the archives. I cannot imagine it is anything other than the crassest lack of responsibility for any capital to risk going back to that when we have a working arrangement in Northern Ireland. We hope it will work even better in future with regard to devolved government. We cannot sacrifice that.

With regard to the EEA+ issue, has any economic analysis been done with respect to practicalities and current legal challenges? Is it possible that the economic analysis could be "gamed out" and Belfast wins, with the financial houses of London not having to go to Frankfurt and Paris but instead setting up a brass plate company in Belfast before being good to go? We have been asked to put forward realistic solutions that are doable. I support the idea of an EEA+ in terms of what it would solve for agriculture, cross-Border issues, an all-island energy economy and all of that kind of stuff. It comes back to the idea that the EU is saying, quite clearly, that Brexit is not going to be a success. If it was a success, everybody would do it. They are hardly going to encourage Brexit to be a success.

It occurs to me that Senator Mark Daly is speaking about the Single Market for services. It is a lot more complex to fracture on an east-west basis than the market for goods. It may be that the best we can hope for is special status as regards goods and having to walk away from services and saying it is part of UK sovereignty or something.

The physical movement of goods is one issue. That is why we are teasing it out. We are doing this as we are talking. If EEA+ is not a runner because of the benefits for brass plate companies establishing in Belfast - I am talking about financial houses or insurance companies - what is the next best thing in the real world? That is probably not possible. If we scale back, EEA+ would be EEA-, including the all-island energy economy, along with agriculture. There is also the issue of hard goods manufactured in Northern Ireland or the South being traded over and back. We talk about the challenge of maintaining the status quo to the point where it might preclude all sorts of things being done in Northern Ireland in order to have the have the benefit of EEA+ for those who are there as of a certain date. Senator McDowell makes a valid point in that there are certain things the EU will not allow as Frankfurt and Paris might like to pick up much of the stuff coming from London and do not want it going to Belfast.

Professor Christopher McCrudden

I am delighted about the way in which the conversation has gone because it seems to be precisely the sort of conversation we should be having. It is about detail, workability and feasibility rather than simply identifying problems. We are now looking towards solutions and that seems to be absolutely the right thing to do. Our position is essentially to float this as an option, partly to tease out precisely these kinds of questions. Until now, as far as I can see, there has been no alternative plan against which one can set exactly the kinds of questions being raised. If we have succeeded in raising those issues, it has been at least a partial success but we can do more than that.

The Senators asked specifically about some implications. The paper I will send to the clerk spends a bit of time teasing out some of the legal issues we have spoken about. As to whether the EEA agreement is compatible with EU law in a broad sense, it is. That has been entirely settled and there is no question on whether it is compatible with EU law. That is a major plus as all the negotiations that had to take place to make it compatible with EU law have already been settled. We are coming back to the known quantity point. We have also been doing work on the details, for example, in terms of the financial contribution that states would need to make if they were to buy into the EEA agreement. We have been doing estimates of that. It is not in the paper but we can send separately some work that is exactly on the question raised about financial services. We have been trying to work out what the implications are for financial services.

Senator McDowell mentioned the distinction between services and goods and he is absolutely right. We already have a functioning EEA market in which precisely that problem has not arisen. We have not yet seen the flow of financial services to Norway, for example, so there are constraints in the EEA treaty meaning that some of the financial services issues are not quite as simple as might be supposed. I want to make Belfast a success and I would be happy for floods of financial services to come to Belfast but unfortunately, our estimate is that will not happen and the benefits are minimal for the financial services industry to move lock, stock and barrel to Belfast. I might send a note to the committee on that issue to explain the background rather than holding it back this morning.

The point is interesting. We can go through key areas like policing and justice and there can certainly be an argument made for whatever EEA arrangements are there. Senator McDowell would know about extradition and how the European arrest warrant would solve the problem. A hard Brexit brings a special problem relating to the peace process in that regard. Tourism is a cross-Border and all-island issue with the related matter of the travel area. There is also the energy market and environmental issues. There is no huge success in Westminster arising from agreements on an EEA level between North and South on those matters. They do not want to see brass plate companies moving there. This is about trying to find out how to make a credible argument to say there is no downside to continuing the European arrest warrant in Northern Ireland, given the special problem we have on the island with that issue. The British Prime Minister, Mrs. Theresa May, has said no deal is better than a bad deal.

When it comes to the European arrest warrant, no deal means we now have the same problem that was dealt with by Governments in the past. The challenge is trying to identify economically, and this is an economic argument, where it is that the EU would turn around and say it cannot agree to the EEA on that.

Professor Christopher McCrudden

One of the reasons for the success of the Belfast Agreement is that it operated in a situation where the economy was improving, in particular in its early days. Not a lot is written about this but it was clearly the case that it was an improving market, in particular in areas of confidence-building, for example, employment. The fact there was an expanding employment market made it a lot easier for greater equality between Catholics and Protestants in employment to come about, which in turn increased the likelihood of the political arrangements being more successful because some of the tensions otherwise in the community had been reduced. I would argue that the notion of splitting the terrorism stuff off from the economic stuff is a mistake. There is a crucial requirement that Northern Ireland, in order to remain peaceful and supportive of the Good Friday Agreement, is going to have to be economically successful, and that if one has an economic basket case on one's Border, that is in itself destabilising. It is destabilising for the Republic and it is going to be destabilising for us. With respect to the Senator, the economics here cannot be hived off. It is an intimate part of the question as a whole. I would resist the notion that it should be separated off in the way that, perhaps as devil's advocate, Senator Daly has been suggesting.

I thank Professor McCrudden most sincerely for his initial remarks and the very detailed responses he gave to the many questions asked by my colleagues. As he mentioned a number of times, we would appreciate any follow-up letters or notes he would like to send. This is a live committee and will continue to work on this issue for another few weeks yet.

I would like to get a copy of Professor McCrudden's published paper.

Professor Christopher McCrudden

I thank the Chairman and the members of the committee for their tolerance.

We will suspend the meeting for a couple of minutes to allow Professor McCrudden to leave. We will return in private session.

Sitting suspended at 4.03 p.m. and resumed in private session at 4.04 p.m.
The select committee adjourned at 4.14 p.m. until 10 a.m. on Thursday, 1 June 2017.
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