It was not by inadvertance that this sub-section found its place in the Bill, or that the word "suspect" found a place in the sub-section. I could talk for hours on the soundness, as a general rule and in normal conditions, of assuming the innocence of persons until their guilt is proved. It is a quite sound principle; most civilised countries have adopted it as a basis of their system of justice, and yet there are few States that have not, from time to time, claimed the right to depart from it in respect of deterrent detention as distinct from punitive imprisonment. States always have claimed and I think always will in times of crisis and emergency the right to depart from that principle and to detain citizens during a time of crisis without cause proved in Court, and without trial. Now, if any State was ever justified in departing from it I think this State is justified in departing from it under existing conditions, and in such conditions as are likely to exist for some months. It is menaced by a conspiracy, and a conspiracy that has had recourse to acts such as disgraced the pages of very few countries in history—a conspiracy that was absolutely ruthless and conscienceless in the methods it adopted to gain its negative destructive end. The foundations of this State are not set. Arms and explosives are secreted throughout the country, and the hysteria of the last year has not passed away. We are asking power, in these conditions, to arrest and detain citizens on evidence short of legal proof. What is the exact force of the word "suspicion" in this context in sub-section (2)? Everything short of absolute knowledge, everything short of proof, is suspicion. Now, persons found committing, or attempting to commit, offences mentioned in Part II, of the Schedule to this Act, will, I hope, be placed on trial. There is no reason why they should not be; but persons reasonably suspected of committing or attempting to commit acts of this kind will, I hope, be detained. We ask power to detain them. We think that is a matter of public safety affecting the citizens and affecting the future of this Nation and State, and that it is necessary that the Executive should have power to detain persons reasonably suspected of having committed the offences set out in the Schedule to this Act. If it is stated that this Bill can be made a medium of tyranny I say it can; and I say it would be impossible to conceive and frame a Bill which, while amply safeguarding the interests of the State and its citizens, would yet be incapable of being used as a medium of tyranny. But, remember, you are giving these powers to an Executive responsible to the people's representatives here from day to day. It can only endure while it retains the confidence of the majority of the people's representatives. It is to such a body that you are entrusting these powers which are certainly far-reaching and certainly drastic, and which are only justified by the situation that exists in the country, a situation which we did not bring about, and a situation which we have done our best to deal with as it should be dealt with.
The alternative to the sub-section, as it reads, is that in fact there could be no deterrent detention in respect of any of the offences set out in Part 2 of the Schedule; that there could only be arrests and trials and imprisonment, and that for everything short of legal proof the suspect should go free. We cannot admit that. Take this crime which occurred yesterday in Wexford. I noticed that one paper refers to it as "a daring crime." I do not agree with that description. Two unarmed men were shot because they refused to deliver up certain property that they were asked to give up. Let us assume that the perpetrators of that cowardly crime get rid of their guns shortly after the outrage; that they are met on the road in or about the time of the occurrence of the outrage, and that they are of a type that would render them reasonably suspect of having committed the outrage. Now, if this sub-section were altered, as it is sought to be altered, men found in these circumstances must go free, because there is no legal proof, and everything, as I say, short of knowledge, everything-short of legal proof, is suspicion. You must, if you give these powers, give them with a certain confidence that they will be used with discretion, that they will be used in the interests of the citizens and of the State, and that the body to which you entrust them, and on which you confer them, is not out simply to take the last ounce out of every bit of authority and every bit of power that this Dáil confers upon it in order to persecute and oppress any section of the citizens. Deputies here know well that there are people who have been interned for a couple of months, and whom it is hoped shortly to be able to release, but who if put on trial, as we could have put them on trial, producing proof and producing evidence, would get many years' sentence of imprisonment. We have tried to preserve that spirit and that outlook in handling the whole situation, but when we introduce a Bill, which we consider is a necessary measure to deal with the middle period, a transition period from war or armed rebellion to normality, certain Deputies get up and suggest that it is necessary to be most niggardly and jealous, as if you were dealing with a body of men who might be expected, as a natural thing, to be oppressive, to be tyrannical and to be unjust. That is not the position, and if it is the position, and if the Dáil believes it is the position, then they ought certainly to change the Executive and select men with a different outlook. If you give these powers we are responsible here from day to day. If they are abused, specific cases can be raised, questions can be asked and matters may be raised on the adjournment, but do not say, in the critical condition of things here, and with all the possibilities there are of trouble in the future that a citizen may not be arrested and detained on anything short of legal proof, and that is what the amendment seeks to say.