I propose to take Questions Nos. 7, 8, 12, 26, 35, 45, 48, 51, 64 and 77 together. It may be helpful, a Cheann Comhairle, if initially I were to set out briefly the present understanding of the law in relation to the grounds on which bail may be refused.
Following the decision of the Supreme Court in the O'Callaghan case in 1966 bail may be refused only if the court is satisfied (a) that there is a danger that the accused will not attend court for trial, or (b) that the accused will attempt to pervert the course of justice by interfering with witnesses or jurors or destroying or concealing evidence. The likelihood that an accused might commit further offences while on bail is not a ground for refusing it.
The House may be interested to know that in a case in 1988 the Supreme Court was invited to reconsider its decision in the O'Callaghan case, particularly in the context of a submission to the effect that a decision to refuse bail on the basis of a likelihood of further offences being committed by an accused while on bail should be regarded as constitutionally permissible. The Supreme Court rejected that submission and reiterated its findings in the earlier case.
I accept there is legitimate and widespread public concern about aspects of the present situation in relation to bail and, indeed, I have made it clear publicly that I share that concern. However, it would not be conducive to a resolution of these difficulties to make exaggerated claims about the effect of our present bail laws on levels of crime or to ignore the complex nature of the issues which arise. In particular, I would have to reject as wide of the mark the reported contention in one of the questions to the effect that the bulk of major crime in the Dublin area can be attributed to a small number of offenders who are on bail.
The reality is that the situation in relation to offences committed while on bail was greatly improved by the Criminal Justice Act, 1984, which provided that a sentence of imprisonment for an offence committed while on bail must be consecutive on any sentence passed for other offences. Largely because of this the number of offences for which persons on bail were charged fell from approximately 8,300 in 1983 to approximately 2,800 in 1992.
Nevertheless, it remains the case that serious offenders facing the likelihood of a long period of imprisonment on other charges are tempted — and sometimes do — to use their time on bail to commit further offences. The Government regards that as being far from satisfactory and is determined that it should be addresed effectively.
Complex problems of both principle and practice have to be addressed in devising an appropriate approach to this matter. While there are clear disadvantages with the operation of our present bail laws, I am sure most Deputies would accept that it would be equally unsatisfactory, in terms of principle, to bring about a situation where, irrespective of the seriousness of offences likely to be committed, a general presumption would exist against the granting of bail. This could result in the highly undesirable situation where a large number of unconvicted persons, many of whom might subsequently be found not guilty, would be incarcerated. In this context, it is worth mentioning that other European countries are endeavouring to reduce the number of unconvicted persons in custody on the grounds of basic human rights.
Apart from considerations of principle, there are sizeable practical difficulties associated with the idea of changing the bail laws. It has been estimated, for example, that if a very stringent bail regime were put in place it could necessitate the provision of upwards of 600 additional prison places at a capital cost of approximately £80 million and annual running costs of £20 million. Even if half that number of additional places were required, the cost would still be quite significant.
In making these points about the complex issues which arise I am not, of course, to be taken as suggesting that the Government has a difficulty in principle with the need for changes in our bail laws or that it would be unwilling to provide the necessary resources to deal with the genuine difficulties to which the present situation gives rise. Far from it, but in the Government's view, it is important in looking at the question of bail to secure a degree of clarity and agreement as to what is actually required.
In this context, and following a review of the situation which I initiated in my Department because of my concern about the operation of our bail laws, last week — with Government approval — I requested the Attorney General to secure the advice of the Law Reform Commission on the options that may be open in order to bring about a change in the law on bail. Given the difficult issues involved, I believe the commission is uniquely well placed to provide the type of in-depth analysis and considered proposals for changes which are required. I am sure all Deputies will join with me in wishing the commission well in carrying out this challenging task.