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Seanad Éireann debate -
Wednesday, 17 Jul 1946

Vol. 32 No. 8

Supplies and Services (Temporary Provisions) Bill, 1946—Committee.

Section 1 agreed to.
Question proposed: "That Section 2 stand part of the Bill."

Sub-section (2) of this section provides that "whenever the Government makes an Order under this section, the Government may, in lieu of making provision for or doing any particular thing in or by such Order, authorise or empower by such Order a Minister or any other person specified or indicated in such Order to make the said provision," and so forth. I cannot understand why these words are inserted in the sub-section—"or any other persons specified or indicated in such Order." It seems to me that the powers conferred by Section 2 fall under seven headings which are set out in sub-section (1), paragraphs (a) to (g), inclusive. These are powers to make regulations for the control of supplies or services, for the control or prohibition of the import or export of particular classes of goods, for the acquisition or seizure of foreign currency, control over the use of land, for the giving of authority to local bodies in certain cases, for the giving of State guarantees in regard to the interest and principal on borrowings by certain bodies and for the reduction or suspension of certain duties. These are the matters which may be provided for under sub-section (1) of Section 2.

It seems to me that while it may be proper in certain cases to authorise the Minister to make Orders in relation to these matters, for instance in relation to the user of land, there is no justification for authorising any person other than the Minister to exercise the authority which is conferred by the section. It may be that what is contemplated is that a Parliamentary Secretary or a permanent secretary of a Department over his own name may make these Orders. I think it would be unwise for us to pass a Bill of this kind, in which a provision is made in relation to the seven points I have mentioned, authorising the making of Orders by some persons other than the Minister. I would urge the Minister to consider whether these words should not go out.

This sub-section is identical with Section 2 (3) of the Act of 1939. One use that was made of that section of the Act of 1939 was to appoint a controller with power to regulate flour and bread supplies. It is not certain that it may not be necessary to have such a post in future. Therefore, it is considered essential that the Minister should have power to authorise a person such as the Controller of Bread and Flour Supplies to carry on this work.

This Bill is, in many ways, very different from the Act of 1939. It has a much narrower scope than the Emergency Powers Act. It authorises the doing of things which are mentioned in sub-section (1), by Order. The sub-section says that "the Government may whenever they think fit, by Order, do all or any of the following things." It sets out these things and then, taking account of the fact that it may be desirable that the Minister should have power once this Order is made, to regulate some of the things to which I refer, the Bill makes provision in sub-section (2) for that power being exercised by the Minister. Then it goes on to say: "or any other person specified in the Order" made by the Government may exercise these powers. If these powers are to be exercised other than by the Government, I would suggest that that should be done by the Minister. If an Order has to be made relating to the control of flour or bread, that Order should be made by the Minister and should not be made by any other person. I think we are going very far if we insert a provision that Orders under a Bill of this kind in relation to the seven matters I have mentioned, are to be handed over to the discretion of a person who will not be answerable to this House. We shall have no right to raise any question regarding the manner in which a person other than the Minister performs these functions. I would urge very strongly that the Minister should not press to have that provision inserted.

Would the Minister tell us in how many other instances somebody was authorised to act in this capacity? In the first place, I should like to make this remark in relation to the sub-section. Surely the Minister can visualise a loosening up of the position, when the same powers will not be necessary? The whole point which he makes would be very well met by authorising the Minister for Supplies to act in this way. I agree with the case made by Senator Duffy and I think myself the Minister ought to see the reasonableness of it. The Minister refers to the Controller of Bread and Flour Supplies. I find it difficult to visualise any situation where a controller of flour would be necessary for the proper control or distribution of flour in a way that could not be arranged by the Minister for Supplies. Looking at it sensibly, it is all important that a power like that should not be delegated to any other person. The phrase is very wide as it is. Anybody at all can be vested with authority under this sub-section. Perhaps the Minister would enlighten us as to how many persons were vested with authority of this kind in the past and what the prospects are of having to use that power in future? The point which the Minister makes, it seems to me, could be adequately met by vesting the Minister for Supplies with that power.

I was aware that a similar power was given in the 1939 Act but, to the best of my recollection, when it was given in 1939 there was a certain amount of misgiving expressed. The situation that existed then was such that it was perfectly possible that Parliament might not be able to meet at all and it seemed necessary to provide the Government with the maximum power. I do not know whether there is any case other than that of the Controller of Flour in which this power was given to a senior official in a Department or whether under strict law the Minister was or was not responsible under the section. In fact, he was, because the official was a senior official of the Department and questions could be put to the Minister and the matter could be raised in debate. The really fundamental thing that arises is that there should be some measure of Parliamentary control. I hardly think there could be any possible intention on the part of the Government to go outside the senior Civil Service in giving powers of this kind. Certain undertakings were given in 1939, and I think we might have an undertaking now that this power will not be given, while the present Government is in office, other than to persons who are responsible to Parliament, through the Ministers concerned.

Might I ask the Minister whether any of the powers delegated under Section 2 would come within the provisions of Section 8 and be tabled automatically in both Houses of the Oireachtas? That would give some control over them. Section 8 says that every document or subsidiary instrument made on or after the operative date shall be laid before each House of the Oireachtas and there are powers to annul. The words "subsidiary instrument" are defined in Section 1 as "an Order or regulation made (whether before or after the passing of this Act) under power conferred by a Government Order". It would appear to me that anything done under sub-section (2) of Section 2 by a person to whom power had been delegated would automatically have to be tabled and, therefore, there would be control in the matter.

I think Senator Kingsmill Moore has answered effectively Senator Duffy's point that a person appointed under this section would not be answerable to the House. Senator Baxter asked how many persons were so appointed under the 1939 Act. Only one was appointed. I do not know how many would be appointed in the future, but I should say it would not be many, as it was found administratively inconvenient for the Minister to delegate his powers under the Act of 1939. All we can say is that the Controller of Bread and Flour operated to save our people a lot of inconvenience that other countries suffered.

In this present Bill, there is a provision that not only Government Orders but also Ministerial Orders and directions in writing of any kind, arising out of the powers conferred on the Government in this Bill, will be tabled. That will give the Seanad an opportunity of raising any particular matter.

Does it say that directions in writing shall be tabled?

It says: "subsidiary instrument". I am informed that that includes directions in writing.

That is not in the definition, which says that "subsidiary instrument" means an Order or regulation.

All the directions have been in the form of Orders up to the present.

Would the Minister think of introducing into the definition section the expression that "subsidiary instrument" means an Order or instrument or direction?

Why should we introduce "direction" until we know what a direction means?

Putting in "direction" would rather ensure that you did know what it means.

Question put and agreed to.
SECTION 3.

I formally move amendment No. 1:

In sub-section (2), page 4, line 25, after the word "Order" to insert the following: "(except the Emergency Powers (No. 178) Order, 1942 (S. R. & O., No. 174 of 1942))".

The effect of this amendment is to retain the existing arrangement under which there is no time limit for bringing summary proceedings, but only in respect of offences committed before the 1st September next. Offences committed after the 1st September next will be subject to these modifications, if the proposed amendment of Section 6 (9) is passed. This is really a consequential amendment, extending the old time limit of six months to 12 months.

I would like to know what the No. 178 Order contained.

Under the Order referred to here, the Government were given power to prosecute for an offence at any time after it had been committed. That was amending the old Act, which limited the taking of proceedings in the law courts to six months. That Order is being abolished and in Section 9 we are substituting 12 months for the six months in the original Act. This amendment is consequential, therefore, to the amendment that we are proposing later on under Section 6 (9).

Amendment agreed to.

On behalf of Senator Sweetman I move amendment No. 2:

In sub-section (2), page 4, line 25, after the word "Order" to insert the following: "(except the Emergency Powers (No. 373) Order, 1946 (S. R. & O. No. 16 of 1946))".

Senator Sweetman has asked me to mention this, as he is unable to be here. Order No. 373 provides, I understand, that the courts shall take judicial cognisance of any Orders made under the Emergency Powers Act. Senator Sweetman was of the opinion that the court should not be bound to take judicial notice of subsidiary Orders. What happens is as follows: the court will be referred to a certain Order and told that it has to take judicial notice of it. That does not mean that the court necessarily is hoodwinked, as the judge can say: "I have to take judicial notice of it, but you must give me a print of it, in order that I may see what is in it." Senator Sweetman was informed that very often what happened in the District Court was that there was no Order there, the court did not know it and the local solicitor said: "Well, it contains something of this nature," giving a rough idea, and the court had to take judicial notice of the document which was not in front of it.

That is a very undesirable state of affairs. Senator Sweetman was anxious to have it limited so that in the case of Orders which were subsidiary Orders—not big Government Orders which are pretty easy to get—the court should not be bound to take judicial notice of them, but that it should be incumbent on the person who wished the court to act on such an Order to produce a copy of it and prove it in court in the ordinary way. If I may respectfully say so, I think that Senator Sweetman's view is one that ought to commend itself to any person who has had anything to do with the courts in which it is necessary to give the judge the exact words of the instrument which he is asked to put into force.

This amendment of Senator Sweetman's proposes to abolish an Order which will be abolished on the 1st September. It will automatically go on that date because it was not included in the White Paper giving the list of Orders to be continued.

I could not find it there.

The Order, as I say, will automatically be abolished on the 1st September. I want to warn Senators that we will be coming to it again on Section 9 because it is proposed to continue certain powers that were in that Order in this particular Bill. There is no necessity for this amendment as this particular Order, which Senator Sweetman wants abolished, will automatically be abolished on the 1st September.

Perhaps I did not put the point very accurately, but this amendment is in connection with Senator Sweetman's later amendment to Section 9. He hopes to be here himself to move that amendment. He asked me to keep him right by moving this amendment which, I think, would be a necessary one to put in if Senator Sweetman is able to carry his amendment to Section 9. I may be wrong in that because I have not had the opportunity of going into this as fully as Senator Sweetman.

The two amendments are not linked.

Amendment No. 2, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed: "That Section 3, as amended, stand part of the Bill."

On the section, Section 3 continues in force a large number of Emergency Powers Orders. One of them, which is specifically referred to in the White Paper, is Emergency Powers (No. 30) Order, 1940. This Order suspended the operation of the Civil Service (Transferred Officers) Compensation Act, 1929. I did not put down an amendment to provide that the Order would be excepted because I recognise that it probably could not come to an end immediately, but I do not think its indefinite extension is satisfactory without some clear indication of what is to be the Government policy on the matter.

In order to make the position clear to the House I want to refer briefly to the history of this matter. As a result of the Treaty of 1921 many thousands of civil servants who had given faithful service to the United Kingdom Government were transferred to the service of the Irish Government. They could, it is true, under the terms of Article 10 of the Treaty, have elected to retire on specially increased pension terms if they were unwilling to serve under the Irish Government, and a small number did so. We are not, of course, concerned with them. But the vast majority were not only willing but eager to give loyal service to a native Government and remained in the Irish service. Under Article 10 of the Treaty, these men, known as "transferred officers", were entitled to retire subsequently on special terms if the conditions of their service as they existed at the time of transfer were altered to their disadvantage by the Irish Government. In certain respects the provisions of Article 10 were found to need elucidation, and in 1929 an agreement, interpreting and supplementing Article 10 of the Treaty, was made.

There were three parties to the agreement of 1929: the Irish Government, the British Government and the transferred officers. According to the statement made by Deputy Costello, speaking in the Dáil on the 26th June, 1946, it was negotiated by him—he was Attorney-General in 1929—following discussion and consultation with representatives of the transferred officers. (The reference is Dáil debates, vol. 101, col. 2479.) This agreement was signed on the 27th June, 1929, on behalf of the British Government by Mr. Philip Snowden and Mr. Sidney Webb, and on behalf of the Irish Government by Mr. Blythe and Mr. McGilligan. It was given the force of law in Ireland by the Civil Service (Transferred Officers) Act, 1929, and in Great Britain by an Act called the Irish Free State (Confirmation of Agreement) Act. For the purpose of the matter we are considering to-day, the main feature of the 1929 agreement was the setting up of a board in this country which was given full power to determine the compensation to be granted to transferred officers whose conditions of service were altered to their disadvantage by the Irish Government.

In June, 1940, the Minister for Finance made a regulation stabilising the Civil Service bonus by reference to a cost-of-living index of 185. As I explained in this House on the 25th July last (Official Debates, cols. 467-471) the Civil Service bonus is not a bonus in the sense in which we ordinarily understand the term "bonus" in the business world.

It is simply a sliding scale adjustment by reference to variations in the purchasing power of money calculated by reference to the cost-of-living index. All basic salaries of civil servants in this country are still fixed in terms of 1914 monetary values, and an addition to the salary, computed by reference to changes in the cost of living and called a "bonus", is paid to the officer. The bonus takes full cognisance of such changes only in the case of the lowest paid officers, and is progressively scaled down as the basic salary rises. The cost-of-living index figure for the purpose of the bonus— assumed to be 100 as at July, 1914— was 230 in September, 1921. It had sunk to 155 in 1933, and the Irish Exchequer reaped the full benefit in reduced bonuses paid to civil servants. It had gone up to 185 by July, 1940, and the effect of the stabilisation regulation was to ignore further increases. This position was maintained until December, 1944, and as from the 1st January, 1945, the operative index figure was altered to 210. But the actual figure in November, 1944, was 296, and I believe the latest official figure published was 287.

Obviously, the Government's departure from the bonus arrangements— effected without any consultation with the Civil Service — would have given grounds to transferred officers to claim compensation under the 1929 Act. In order to prevent the presentation of such claims the Government, again, I understand, without consultation with the officers concerned, made an Order under the Emergency Powers Act on the 26th June, 1940, suspending the operation of the 1929 Act, and Section 3 of this Bill continues this suspension. Speaking in the Dáil on the 26th June last the Minister for Industry and Commerce said (column 2471):—

"When it was proposed to suspend the operation of that Act, following upon the stabilisation of the bonus, the British Government was so informed and, on the understanding that the suspension of the Act would be for the period of the emergency only, the British Government intimated that it had no observations to offer."

The Emergency Powers Order (No. 30 of 1940) which suspended the operation of the 1929 Act and, of course, of the agreement with the British Government which is contained in the Schedule of that Act, is continued in force by Section 3 of the Bill now before the House.

It is probably known to members of the House that on two occasions the British Government took action to protect the interests of these officers whom they transferred to the Irish service, with a view to securing that they should be compensated in the event of their conditions of service at the time of the transfer being altered to their disadvantage, and, whilst the British intimated in 1940, when they were extremely preoccupied with other matters, that they had no observations to offer on that proposal to suspend temporarily the 1929 agreement, it is very probable that they would object to the scrapping of the agreement or to the interests of the transferred officers being permanently affected. I am not personally concerned with what may be or may not be the views of the British Government but rather with our obligation to keep faith with civil servants who have served us well and to whom we gave an undertaking which we ought to keep. It was pointed out by the Minister in the course of the debate on this matter in the Dáil that if the Act of 1929 as it stands were allowed to become operative again many civil servants would be entitled to retire on special terms because of the alterations which have already taken place in their terms of service in the period from 1940 to the present date, and it was suggested to him that this difficulty might be met by an amendment of the 1929 Act which would provide for excluding from consideration what has already happened whilst restoring the rights of transferred officers for the future. Obviously, if something along these lines was to be adopted the Government could not properly proceed by unilateral action. It is not good enough to say to the civil servants who are affected by this Order: "You have served us so well and are so useful to us that we cannot keep our bargain with you". That is virtually what is being said. The integrity of the Civil Service is essential to the welfare of any democratic State. We expect the highest standard possible of honour from civil servants and it seems to me that they are entitled to expect an equally high standard of honour from the State in its dealings with them and in the maintenance and keeping of agreements.

It seems to me that this matter should, as in 1929, be the subject of negotiation and discussion with representatives of the transferred officers, and that any amendment of the agreement with the British Government, which is scheduled in the 1929 Act, should be effected by negotiating with that Government an agreed amendment after consultation with our civil servants who are affected. I am informed that there are upwards of 6,000 transferred officers still in our Civil Service. There is a much smaller class whose interests, I think, should not be overlooked. I mean the men who have retired under the age limit since the bonus was stabilised and whose superannuation awards were adversely affected by this stabilisation. The superannuation awarded to an established civil servant under the conditions of his service is a provision for his future after he retires. Under provisions contained in the Superannuation Acts of 1859 and 1909, the amount of the award is limited to a proportion (depending on the length of service) of the remuneration he was receiving at the time of his retirement. The amount of this remuneration was arbitrarily reduced by the Government as a temporary measure during the emergency, and it would be iniquitous if the amount of the pension of an officer who retired during the emergency were to be reduced for the rest of his life merely because he reached the age limit during the emergency.

I might add that not only the amount of the annual pension is involved. The transferred officers who reached the age limit since July, 1940, would have been in the service of the British Government since 1909. In that year male officers who were already in the service were given an option to elect to be superannuated when they ultimately retired in either of two ways (a) they could receive a pension equal to two-thirds of their remuneration at retirement, or (b) a lump sum plus a pension equal to half of the remuneration at retirement. Most of them, I am informed, chose the second method, that is, they elected to commute one-fourth of the full pension for the right to a lump sum. In justice, it seems to me, there can be no discrimination between the two types of case, and in cases falling under the second class, that is (b), the revision of the superannuation award must apply to the lump sum as well as to the annual pension.

As I have said I did not put down an amendment asking that this Order should be expected because I recognise that Order No. 30 must remain in force for some little time until the matter is fully considered. I think the House should expect from the Government an assurance that this matter will be carefully considered and that arrangements will be made by which anything that we promised or undertook to give the Civil Service will be put right as equitably and as soon as practicable.

I would like to say that I approach this question from a slightly different angle from that of Senator Douglas. Apart from every other consideration it appears to me that the Government is morally bound to put civil servants in the same position in relation to their relationship with their employers as it is proposed to do in the case of every other employee. At the moment a Bill entitled the Industrial Relations Bill is going through the Dáil, the purpose of which is to set up new machinery which will regulate conditions between employers and workers as from the 1st September of this year. When that Bill becomes an Act, Emergency Powers Order (No. 260) which has been the instrument used for that purpose during the last five years will be revoked. For some strange reason the Government in relation to its employees refused to revoke the Emergency Powers Order under which certain restrictions were placed on a number of civil servants.

I do not desire at this stage to consider, except in a very brief way, what may be the effect of the revocation of Order No. 30 of 1940 beyond saying this: That the purpose of the Order is to place a certain number of civil servants in a strait-jacket and I do not think this House ought to agree to that purpose being continued. When this State was set up 25 years ago, some 21,000 civil servants were transferred from the British to the Irish Government. These civil servants were free to choose to serve an Irish Government or to serve a British Government. In the making of that choice they were perfectly free and 21,000 of them chose to serve an Irish Government.

When they were making that choice, certain guarantees were given to them by their old employers and by their prospective employers in relation to their future conditions and terms of service. As Senator Douglas pointed out, the provisions of Article 10 of the Treaty were subject to negotiation subsequently and the agreement reached was scheduled to an Act of the Oireachtas in 1929. During that period, between 1921 and 1946, 15,000 civil servants retired on pension. The great majority retired—probably 90 per cent. —because they had reached the retiring age. All of them, whether they left the service before the retiring age or whether they remained until the retiring age, enjoyed the privileges, or shall I say the rights, conferred upon them by the Treaty and by the Act of 1929. The 6,000 who are still serving are denied the exercise of those rights. I am concerned only at this moment with the right of the civil servants to have liberty to do what they contracted to do and what the State contracted they should be permitted to do. That is, to have recourse to the tribunal, if they so desired.

Is it likely that there will be a rush on the part of those 6,000 persons to quit the service once they are free to retire, as they would be if this Emergency Powers Order were revoked? I think that is unlikely. Of the 6,000 persons concerned, 4,057 are employed in the Post Office. That is to say, they are postmen, post office clerks and minor-grade civil servants, the great majority of whom are unable to live a reasonable life on their present salaries and, therefore, most unlikely to retire until they are obliged to retire. It was argued in the other House that, if this Order were to be revoked, and if civil servants were to be free to retire at 50 or 55 years of age and have recourse to the board set up under the Act of 1929, there would be a flood of resignations. Surely, that is untrue. I do not think that any sensible person would suggest that a postman, who finds it hard to live on £4 a week, will go out on a pension of £2 per week. That is fantastic. These 6,000 persons have been in the service since 1921. They had many opportunities of going before the board and making a case for retirement under the Act of 1929 if they had desired to do so. In 1933, for instance, there was a cut in all Civil Service salaries. Every one of the transferred civil servants then serving could have made a first-class case before the board for permission to retire under the Act of 1929. None of the 6,000 persons now serving chose to take that course. I think that it is true to say that, during the past 25 years, there were a number of occasions upon which every one of the transferred civil servants could have made an excellent case before the board, if he desired to do so, for permission to retire. Those who are now concerned have been loyal to the Government. They have continued to serve the State. They have taken all the knocks coming to them and now the Minister thinks that, if he revokes this Order, which holds them in a strait-jacket, they will leave the service en masse. I think that that is most unlikely, for the reasons I have stated.

As a matter of fact, I have spoken to civil servants affected by this Order, who might be said to be in the higher reaches of the service. I asked them frankly whether, if the machinery of the 1929 Act were restored, there would be a rush of the higher civil servants into retirement. The answer I got was that, even amongst the higher-grade civil servants, there would be no anxiety to retire because they could not afford it. Many of them would prefer to remain on after the retiring age if permitted so to do. Anybody who reaches the age of 60 is entitled to retire from the Civil Service and this Order does not affect them; it affects only those who are under 60 years of age. That is to say, persons who were comparatively young in 1921. Any person who was 40 years of age at the time of transfer is now 65. Anybody who was 35 years of age then is now entitled to retire because he has reached the age of 60, so that we are really dealing with people who were comparatively young civil servants at the time of the transfer. The great majority of them held minor positions and still hold minor positions. As I have said, 4,057 of these officers are employed in the Post Office. The next largest group—775—is employed by the Department of Finance. I take it that that includes officers employed by the Revenue Commissioners. So on down the ranks. The figure includes people in the lowest scale of the Civil Service and people who are never likely to reach the higher levels at which it could be claimed that their continued employment is essential for the maintenance of the Government machine.

What is this board that was set up by agreement between the transferred civil servants, the Irish Government and the British Government in 1929? The constitution of the board is provided for in Section 3 of the Civil Service (Transferred Officers) (Compensation) Act, 1929. It provides that the board shall consist of a chairman and two members representing the Minister for Finance and two members representing the transferred officers. It is a board in which the position of the chairman can, and is often likely to be, the deciding factor. The persons who desire to retire under the Act of 1929 on the grounds that their position in the service has been made worse by some action of the Government must satisfy a board that they are entitled to the conditions prescribed in the agreement affixed to the Act of 1929. They have got to satisfy a board on which they have two friends and may I say as lightly as I can, two opponents, with a neutral chairman, who is, of course, appointed by the Minister. No doubt the chairman at the date of his appointment must be a judge of the Supreme Court, of the High Court or of the Circuit Court.

I have no doubt the Minister will agree that so far as the chairman is concerned it is likely in the long run that he is going to be the deciding factor. The chairman is not likely to act unfairly. Unless the civil servant who desires to retire can make an excellent case for the enjoyment of these provisions, he is not likely to succeed. The argument, therefore, for the retention of the Order is that the Minister knows he has done something to these people that he is not entitled to do and that if they go before the board they will be able to satisfy the board that the Government has broken its agreement with the civil servants. On these grounds and on no other grounds are they entitled to the advantage that they secured for themselves and which was conceded by an Irish Government in 1929. It is true, of course, that there is associated with this issue the question of the stabilisation of the bonus to which Senator Douglas has referred, but I do not think that this question of the stabilisation of the bonus has a real bearing on the question. These 6,000 people have accepted buffetings of every kind for a quarter of a century and they are still in the service. I think, therefore, that what they are seeking more than anything else is that the Minister would trust them to serve the State efficiently and voluntarily and not put them in the position of being tied to their posts as if they were just irresponsible people who could not be relied upon to live in liberty. I think the Minister is unfair to himself and unfair to the State when he acts in this manner towards people who have served the State notwithstanding all the rebuffs they have got from this Government and its predecessor during the last 25 years. I, therefore, urge very strongly that so far as Emergency Powers Order No. 230 is concerned, it should be excluded from the provisions of this Bill.

I spoke on this matter on the Second Stage of this Bill and there is very little that I would like to add to what Senator Douglas and Senator Duffy have said except this point. It seems to me that this is immoral. Supposing you heard of an employer who had made a written agreement with his employees and had gone outside for a person as a witness and then without giving any notice or without any consultation simply said: "I am not going to keep this agreement because you are good and so loyal, so efficient". That is something which seems to me to be immoral. It is from this angle I think we should look at the matter. The civil servants affected by this Order are not civil servants who have refused to serve the Irish State. They are civil servants who elected to serve it and they have served not only one Government but two Governments and gave service which has won for them so to speak, golden opinions from all shades of politicians and because they were so good we are telling them that there can be an exodus if this Order was kept in being. Speaking in the other House on the Second Stage of this Bill, the Minister for Finance who is a better judge, said that if we released them from control to-morrow and allowed them to go before the tribunal again, he thought there would be very few cases indeed. There would be very few cases for two reasons. The great bulk of these people cannot afford to retire on any terms and a good many more of them who are regarded by the Minister as key-men, have got substantial promotions and for that reason are not likely to retire.

Apart altogether from the question of money and material gain, there is an irksome feeling that in this particular Order they are being unfairly treated. That is something the Minister should not do to people who have served so loyally, as Senator Duffy has said, for the past 25 years. Possibly what the Minister is really worried about is the effect upon the Civil Service in general. He told us that this Order was necessary. If that is so, perhaps the Minister would give us an idea of what is going to happen the people of whom Senator Douglas spoke, those who went out on superannuation during the emergency with their pensions calculated on stabilised bonus and salary. I think the Government of a State should be just as anxious to fulfil its agreements made with its own employees as any ordinary employer should be and that they should avoid giving bad example. This is peculiarly bad example and the case that there would be an exodus from the Civil Service is not a sufficient justification.

I always suspect the strength of a case when Senators have to fall back on accusations of breaches of the moral law. I do not think we have broken the moral law. When we introduced Order No. 30 in 1940 it was necessary if our people were to survive the catastrophe of the war that we should take very drastic action and in doing so we trampled on the corns of a very large number of citizens indeed. War conditions compelled us to do it. Senator Duffy says that we interfered with the rights of the civil servants to the extent that this was necessary to protect the rights of the citizens as a whole, including the civil servants.

If we had allowed wages and salaries of all descriptions to rise with the cost of living, undoubtedly the taxpayers of the country would be saddled with a very big bill and consumers with an ever-increasing rise in cost of goods. This Order No. 30 was portion of a general scheme of action which the Government took in order to keep down, as far as they could, costs of living and the costs of taxes which are an item in the cost of living and in order generally to make certain that whatever costs were there would be distributed equitably. The emergency that called for the introduction of Order No. 30 of 1940 is not yet over, and the only reason, I am certain, that the Seanad would agree to the Second Reading of a Bill of this kind is because Senators know it is not over. If it is not over for the community as a whole, and if the Seanad is entrusting the Government and the Minister for Industry and Commerce with these powers, with which they would not normally be entrusted, it follows that they should also agree that there is a condition of affairs still existing which warrants the Government in continuing in operation Order No. 30 of 1940.

I agree with Senator Hayes that if we abolish Order No. 30 of 1940 and allow 6,000 transferred civil servants afterwards to go before a reconstituted tribunal, we should have very few cases. I do not know how many — it is anybody's guess—we would have in the first few months but certainly if we had one or two, that might entice more to go. If the remainder of the transferred officers did not see their way to do so, they would be disgruntled that certain officers had gone off. The remainder of the civil servants, for whom we must have some regard, would be disgruntled even if only a few went off. On the whole, I think we would be well advised in present circumstances to continue that Order and to give power to continue it under this Bill. Senator Hayes wants to know what will happen that particular Order after a year. I do not know what is going to happen. No one can prophesy what is going to happen in the next year. Things may improve or things may not improve sufficiently rapidly to enable us to get rid of all these Orders. If they improve so rapidly as to enable us to get rid of them with safety to the interests of the community, no one will be better pleased than the members of the Government.

May I suggest that the Minister is over-convincing?

You are very gentle with him.

The Minister has been very gentle with some of us. I would point out that the issue involved is not that adverted to by the Minister. Strictly speaking it has nothing to do with the public interest or salaries or wages. The only issue is whether the Minister would trust civil servants to act reasonably in the absence of this Order. I would recall to the Minister's mind that the Public Services (Temporary Economies) Act, 1933, enacted by the Government through his predecessor, invited civil servants to tender their resignations if they were dissatisfied and to apply to the board to have their pensions settled in accordance with the Act of 1929. I do not know how many did apply but there were 10,000 or 12,000 civil servants involved. Somebody mentioned that the number who actually retired was 40 out of 10,000 or 12,000. How many are likely to retire, now that we have only 6,000 of these civil servants, if this Order were revoked? As the Minister says, it is anybody's guess. I do not know but I have a suspicion, from any talk I have had with civil servants, that very few will retire, once it is revoked. They, however, resent the Order being there, just as members of trade unions resent Order No. 260. The Minister for Industry and Commerce is taking steps to get rid of Order No. 260 as from 1st September and I ask the Minister for Finance to do the same thing in regard to these civil servants.

Here is a rather remarkable thing. As has been emphasised by everybody who spoke the civil servants concerned are people who voluntarily chose to serve the Irish Government. Suppose they had not voluntarily chosen to serve, supposing they had been coaxed in from Britain, how would the Minister have treated them? He would have acted in a totally different manner. A few weeks ago we had before us the Superannuation Bill, 1946, in which the Minister inserted a special provision to deal with one solitary civil servant who did not voluntarily enter the service of the Irish Government but was induced to come from London to take up a post in Ireland. Because he came over from London, as a result of inducements offered to him, he is going to suffer none of the disabilities of those who decided at the very outset that they would take their chance here in Ireland. The Minister for Finance, speaking in the Dáil on the 25th of June, deals with that. Speaking on the Second Stage of the Superannuation Bill he says:

"Section 3 is entirely new and deals with a special case in respect of which it was found necessary to take exceptional measures when the Public Services (Temporary Economies) Act, 1933, was being enacted. On account of personal undertakings given to the individual concerned shortly after the Saorstát Éireann administration began to function, my predecessor, who promoted the Public Services (Temporary Economies) Act, felt, after representations made to him from the Opposition Benches, that an exception should be made and this officer was exempted from the reduction in salary applied to civil servants generally. In view of the headline set in the 1933 Act, I have felt that this officer should similarly be exempted from the bonus stabilisation provisions imposed on the civil servants as a whole."

This is an illuminating situation. The man who stood out and said: "I am not going to serve any Irish Government until I know exactly how I am going to be treated," has special provision made for him not merely in regard to salary and bonus but in regard to pension.

Business suspended at 6 p.m. and resumed at 7 p.m.

The civil servants who are affected by this Order are probably not without resources. I was hoping that, when the whole of the facts were brought to the notice of the Minister and when it became clear to him that nothing worth while was being risked in revoking this Order but that the Government and the country stood to gain considerably by trusting the Civil Service to continue loyally without being tied in any way, the Minister might assure the House that he was willing to have this Order taken out of the Bill. If he takes the long view, I think he will agree that that would be the wisest course. I urge him strongly to give an assurance that this Order No. 30 will not be continued after the 1st September next.

I have said nearly all I want to say. The matter was considered very seriously before the Bill was introduced in the Dáil and even since then.

Unfortunately, when the second amendment was under discussion, I was on a deputation to one of the Minister's colleagues. I understand that the Minister stated that Order No. 373—and what applies to that Order applies to every Order— automatically lapses in September. Is not the situation the reverse—that Orders are automatically continued unless they are revoked?

The word "automatically" is probably the wrong word. Without any further decision of the Government, the Orders will lapse because each Minister has to bring forward to the Government a revoking Order where the Government has not agreed that they should be continued and the list of Orders that the Government has agreed should be continued has been circulated to both Houses in the White Paper.

Therefore, every Order that is in force, other than the Orders in the White Paper, will be revoked?

That meets my point.

Is it not a fact that the Emergency Powers Acts, 1939-1945, cease to operate after the 1st September?

For that reason, I suggest that any Order made under those Acts cannot be continued beyond that date except by legislation.

They are continued by Section 3.

I said "except by legislation". This is legislation.

Section 3, as amended, agreed to.
Section 4 and 5 agreed to.
SECTION 6.

I formally move amendment No. 3:—

To delete sub-section (9) and substitute the following sub-section:—

(9) Notwithstanding sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act, 1851, summary proceedings for an offence under this section may be instituted within 12 months from the date of the offence.

Would the Minister explain one thing to the House? I do not know the answer — perhaps I should. Is it the institution of the proceedings that counts in regard to time or is it the termination with the decision of the court that counts? I imagine it is the institution.

Amendment agreed to.
Section 6, as amended, agreed to.
Sections 7 and 8 agreed to.
SECTION 9.

I move amendment No. 4:—

In sub-section (1) to delete the words "every subsidiary instrument and every direction in writing"; the words "or subsidiary instrument" in line 20; and the words "or direction in writing given" in lines 20-21.

The purpose of this amendment is fairly clear from the wording of it. The section declares that "every Government Order, every subsidiary instrument and every direction in writing" in the case of all these things, "shall before the operative date be deemed always to have been judicially noticed." I am seeking to delete the words "subsidiary instrument and direction in writing". The effect of this section, of course, is that it avoids the necessity for the prosecution of having to hand in during the hearing of the case a particular Order, subsidiary instrument or direction in writing. Quite frankly, I feel that it would be more satisfactory if not only the subsidiary instrument and the direction in writing had to be handed in, but also if the Orders had to be so handed in. I understand that an omnibus amendment dealing with these three matters was considered in the other House, and for that reason I am trying, so far as I can, to avoid discussing again, from the same angle, matters already debated in the Dáil. For that reason and rather against my will, I have left in the words "Government Order".

I do think it is important that there should always be, as a matter of strict law, in the hands of whatever court it may be, the Order, the subsidiary instrument and the direction in writing under which a man is being prosecuted. It is not reasonable to expect everyone to know, in the same way that everybody is expected to know the statute law, about the subsidiary instrument and the direction in writing. The Minister, I think, will agree with me that if it is not essential to have the Orders available, that, very often, what is given for the benefit of the district justice is the view of the particular Order by the State solicitor concerned. I think it is an essential part of fairness in criminal proceedings that the actual subsidiary instrument and the direction in writing should be handed in to the court. It will not mean that additional trouble of a worth-while nature is being imposed on the State. It will merely mean, where prosecutions are going to be taken, that when the evidence is being given the solicitor or person conducting the prosecution will hand in the Order to the tribunal, whether that tribunal is an ordinary court or the Special Criminal Court. If that is done, then the subsidiary instrument or the direction in writing so handed in will be put on the records.

It is conceivable that, without that, there could be a miscarriage of justice because of the fact that the exact terms of the Order were not before the court at the time when the case was disposed of. I am fully aware, of course, that justices would have the right to call for the Order, but when dealing with a tremendous number of cases in a District Court it is not always feasible to deal with the matter on that line. If it were made a part of the statutory proof that the prosecution should produce these, I do not think that any prosecution, properly considered and properly tendered, would fall to the ground on that head, and I do not think there could be any suggestion that we would have in any way interfered with the proper enforcement of the law in this type of case. I would seriously ask the Minister to give favourable consideration to this suggestion.

I support the amendment as a lesser concession to the deletion of the whole section. This whole matter of judicial notice has preoccupied me for the last two years as I have had certain cases in court before district justices under the Emergency Powers Act and Orders. I, as a lawyer, had understood that the proper procedure was that an Order made under statute did not prove itself, and that it had to be proved in accordance with the law. Section 4 of the Documentary Evidence Act of 1925, as adapted, provides that rules, orders, regulations or by-laws may be proved by the production of a copy of such rules, orders, regulations or by-laws printed under the superintendence or authority of, and published by, the Stationery Office. Now, when a charge is brought against a citizen of this State it must be proved by evidence. There are three exceptions to matters which must be proved, namely: (1) matters which are judicially noticed; (2) matters which are presumed; and (3) matters which are admitted.

The question is, what are matters which are judicially noticed? A great number of matters are judicially noticed, such as the number of days in the week, the number of days in the year, the geography of the State and particular statutes of the State. Statutes passed after 1850 were declared to be judiciously noticed by the Interpretation Act of 1889, so, therefore the district justice is presumed to know the law as enacted by the Legislature and as set out in the statutes. He is not presumed to know what is in an Order made under a statute either by the Government as a whole or by a Minister. Therefore, in order to prove an Order which is given the force of law, but which the district justice is not presumed to know is law, a procedure has been laid down by law for the proof of such Order, namely, to hand in a copy of the Order as published by the Stationery Office. That would be quite simple and would be the ordinary procedure in prosecutions. Prosecutors ought to know the law, at least more law than the citizen who may not be represented by a lawyer. I noticed that the habit had grown up of not proving Government Orders in the ordinary way as required by law.

I protested, but my protest was brushed aside by a district justice who would not listen to law. Two years afterwards the matter was brought before the Court of Criminal Appeal and a conviction was set aside, because the Order was not produced before the special tribunal. But then something happened which I think is a disgrace to the Government. An ex post facto Emergency Powers Order was made, No. 373 of 1946, Statutory Rules and Orders No. 16 of 1946 which stated:—

"Every Government Order, including this Order, and every subsidiary instrument shall be (and, in the case of every such Order or instrument made before the date of this Order, be deemed always to have been) judicially noticed".

Then there was a sop thrown in:—

"Nothing in this article shall render a person, who has been acquitted of an offence, liable to be charged again with that offence."

The fact remains that a person could not in law, even if wrongly acquitted, be brought up and charged a second time. This Emergency Powers Order arose from the incompetence of State prosecutors and their incompetence was bolstered up by an Emergency Powers Order.

Now how is that Emergency Powers Order to be proved and how could a district justice take judicial notice of it? It would be necessary in strict law to hand in the Order at every hearing in order that the district justice should be made aware of it and that every other Order should be judicially noticed. That Order was discussed in the Dáil on political lines, but I have no intention of dealing with it on political lines here. I am dealing with it purely from the legal point of view. Instead of following the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal and carrying on in future what had been carried on for years, the Government made this Order bolstering up the mistake of prosecuting counsel.

Section 9 of the Bill we are now discussing is intended to perpetuate that Order in legislative form. The explanatory memorandum issued with the Supplies and Services (Temporary Provisions) Bill, 1946, contains the following:

"Section 9. — Judicial notice of Government Orders, subsidiary instruments and directions. This section re-enacts the provisions of Emergency Powers (No. 373) Order, 1946. ..."

It does not re-enact it. It goes further because in Emergency Powers (No. 373) Order, 1946, there is no mention at all of directions. It is confined to every Government Order and every subsidiary instrument. So that the House may understand what a subsidiary instrument is, I would like to explain that under Section 2 of the Emergency Powers Act, 1939, the Government was empowered to make Orders dealing with certain matters provided it was necessary to do so or expedient for securing the public safety, or the preservation of the State, or for the maintenance of public order, or for the provision and control of supplies and services essential to the life of the community. Under that section an omnibus Order—No. 224 of 1939 —was made. It gave power to Ministers to make Orders under it and therefore an Order made under Order No. 224 of 1939 was a subsidiary Order. A somewhat similar scheme is proposed in this Bill. The Government will make an Order and the Minister will make an Order under that Order; the Minister's Order would then be a subsidiary instrument. But here in this Bill it is provided that when the Minister gives a direction it shall be deemed to be and to have been judicially noticed.

You can purchase a Government Order or a subsidiary instrument in the Stationery Office but where can you purchase or even see a direction— an oral direction. I see now that it says: "every direction in writing shall be deemed to be judicially noticed" but where can you purchase the direction if it is not published as an Order? I would suggest that this section should be removed from the statute roll at the earliest possible moment. It is a blot on it and should never have come on it. The Emergency Powers No. 373 Order of 1946 should never have been made. Instead of taking their beating in court like men the Government resort to the might of the State under the Emergency Powers Order. This particular document had nothing to do with the preservation or the security of the State or with the control of supplies and services. It was merely to bolster up lost prestige because they would never admit they were wrong. I do not expect that this will be deleted from the Bill. I hope when this Act expires that we shall see the last of this judicial notice of Orders or of directions or anything like that.

There is no reason why there should be one law for the prosecutors and another law for the prosecuted. Why should the prosecutors get any advantage as regards procedure in trials over and above what the defendant or the accuser has to put up with? I support Senator Sweetman's amendment not just because he does not move to delete the section but because I support the principle involved in it.

There is one particularly vicious thing about this provision. It has been touched upon by the other speakers, but because they did so in a broad way I do not think they have underlined it.

Subsidiary instruments have to be tabled. At least they are brought to the notice of the Oireachtas and, being tabled, they are at least printed, but directions do not come within the definition of subsidiary instruments. They will not be tabled, they may not be printed, they may not be even roneographed, and the court has to take notice of a document of which there may be only one copy in existence which is not available to the court. That I think to be particularly vicious. I have got so accustomed to the habit of the Government when they see a mistake has been made of passing an emergency Order to stop the hole that I was very relieved to hear Senator Michael Ryan voicing genuine heartfelt indignation at a process which I have always thought to be stealing legislative power from the Oireachtas and an abuse of Governmental and executive functioning.

It has really gone too far when the courts are told to take notice of a document which has never been put before the Oireachtas in the form of tabling and which may never have seen the light of day except in one copy made by a person to whom power has been delegated by the Government under an earlier section of this Bill. I do hope that the Minister will at least see his way to take out of that section the word "direction" so that the courts shall not be bound to take judicial notice of a thing which is not procurable at the Stationery Office.

I am advised that it is necessary to keep these words which Senator Sweetman proposes to delete in the section in order that the prosecutions may be——

Messed up as usual.

——carried out when people break the laws that we are passing in these sections of the Bill. I can see objection to a court being compelled to take judicial notice of a document which has never been published. Some of the prosecutions which were turned down by the court were based upon Orders which had been published. After all, if a citizen is presumed to know the law, and if he can get a sentence of six months for breaking it, I think that the judge on the bench should also be presumed to know the law.

Will the Minister undertake, on behalf of the Government, to supply every district justice with a copy of every Order, every subsidiary instrument and ever direction, so that he may then take judicial notice of them? Otherwise, he cannot.

I cannot say off-hand whether or not a district justice is supplied with Acts of Parliament.

Only with Acts of Parliament—not with Orders.

I know that this question of the publication of Orders was discussed here and that the Taoiseach undertook to try to get these Orders published in convenient form. That work is in hands at the moment. Quite recently, we published all the Orders up to a certain date. Then, the work of publishing later Orders in convenient form was put in hand. I take it that, if it is easy to give a district justice bound volumes of the Acts of Parliament, it will be easy to provide bound volumes of the Orders.

They should get them as issued—not a year afterwards, when bound.

I do not wish to interrupt, but my amendment does not deal with Orders at all.

It seems to me, as a layman, that, if the ordinary citizen can get six months for breaking an Order, the judge on the bench should know the contents of the Order. There may be some legal heresy in that.

Is there not a prosecution on record on foot of an Order which had been repealed?

The Senator can make that allegation but I should like to get the date and an opportunity of going into the facts.

An ordinary citizen should not be convicted and get six months on foot of an Order which cannot be produced and proved to the judge. How can he be presumed to know of an Order which cannot be produced to the judge?

There is one provision in this Bill that was not in the 1939 Act. In future, all Government Orders, Ministerial Orders, and subsidiary instruments so far as I remember, will be laid on the Table of the House and a Senator or Deputy may move to annul them.

I introduced a Private Bill for that purpose and it was turned down.

In future, all the Senator will have to do is to table a resolution. I cannot argue this matter further. I am advised that the section, as it stands, is necessary. As I have said, Government Orders, Ministerial Orders, and subsidiary instruments will be tabled in the Library and, if any Senator objects to them, he can move to have them annulled.

This section deals with Orders made before the operative date.

So far as I understand, the section deals with Orders made before the operative date which are continued by virtue of this Bill, plus any Orders made by virtue of this Bill after the operative date.

The old Orders will not be tabled.

Any subsidiary instrument made prior to the operative date will be tabled, as I understand the wording of Section 8. The Minister has completely failed to meet the point I made in putting this amendment and which was put very much more closely by Senator Ryan, who showed that he had gone into the matter very fully. There seems to me to be a serious matter of principle involved. I can perfectly easily imagine a District Court justice, in pursuance of this section, giving a decision in a case in which he is presumed to know the existence of every subsidiary instrument and direction in writing that would bear on the charge but of which he does not, in fact, know. I can see that happening quite easily. I can see the strongest possibility of a conviction against a man on a misunderstood interpretation of the law, because the subsidiary instruments and directions in writing relevant to the case were not handed into court. It could easily happen that the justice would be depending on recollection alone; he might not have a copy of the direction in writing before him. Probably, he would never have seen it. The most he would have seen would be a reference in a newspaper or a reference put up by the person conducting the prosecution. There is involved in this matter an absolutely vital principle affecting the fairness of the way in which people are to be prosecuted before our courts. Nobody is trying to shelter wrongdoers. Nobody is suggesting that a wrongdoer should not get the full rigour of the law to which his offence entitles him. We are suggesting that there should be a certainty, beyond any possible shadow of doubt, that the full legal position was before the court when judging and sentencing that man.

Nothing is to be gained by this section except the saving of a little trouble to the Department concerned —and a very little trouble at that. The saving of a little trouble is not worth the risk that a man might be convicted unfairly, might be sentenced unfairly and might have his whole life ruined. The Department would be saved merely the trouble of sending down to a court and handing in the subsidiary instrument or direction in writing upon which they were basing their case. Senator Ryan has given a clear example of the State's taking up its mighty sledge-hammer against an individual of humble means. There is no justification for saying that a man should be prosecuted without the person who is drawing the prosecution having all the legal forms, statutes, orders, subsidiary instruments and directions in writing before him. If the man who frames the prosecution must have all these things before him, what is to prevent him from sending those things to the court in question and having them handed in so that the full implications of these documents will be present to the court when the case comes before it?

The House has in recent weeks been accustomed to seeing Senator Ryan and myself knocking spots off each other and the fact that we are joined together on this shows that there is a real principle at issue—a principle of whether a man is going to be convicted fairly and according to the law or whether he is going to be convicted on what might be purely a recollection.

All I can say is that I do not believe a district justice would sentence a man who was prosecuted for an offence if he had not seen the law on the matter. Senator Ryan indicated certain things that justices are presumed to know and one of those things is the statutes passed by the Oireachtas. The State has not to prove in court to a district justice that a particular Act was passed. A justice is presumed to know the law and the prosecution has not to prove it or to prove the number of days in the week and so on. I think it is fairly reasonable to assume that when an Order has been put down on the Table of the House a justice is presumed to know of its existence. If he cannot get a copy either from some member of the legal profession in court or somewhere else I am sure he would postpone the case until he can get a copy, until it is either handed to him by someone else or obtained by him in some way. I do not see how Senator Sweetman can really be afraid of a miscarriage of justice because this is put into the Bill.

The Minister made one statement on which I am prepared to take him up. He does not see how a justice can go wrong about an Order laid on the Table of the House. Will the Minister undertake to amend Section 8 so that all written instructions will be tabled? If he does I am prepared to withdraw.

All I can do is this. If a man is prosecuted for a breach of a Government Order, subsidiary instruction or direction in writing, and if the direction in writing has not been laid on the Table of the House it can be proved in court. I think I would be justified in promising on behalf of the Minister for Industry and Commerce who is affected by this more than anyone else, that where a direction in writing is given and has not been tabled it will be proved in court.

Directions in writing are never tabled.

If it is not tabled it will be proved. But every Order or subsidiary instrument is tabled.

Then I think the Minister and I can meet each other. If instead of deleting the words "every subsidiary instrument and every direction in writing" we merely delete the words "every direction in writing" it will meet the point. Subsidiary instruments are tabled and directions in writing are not. I am suggesting either of two ways to the Minister; either that he adds to Section 8 "that direction in writing" shall be tabled and in that event Section 9 will require no amendment or that he will leave Section 8 as it is. I will withdraw my amendment if the Minister will put in an amendment deleting "direction in writing" from Section 9. I am perfectly prepared to adopt either course, whichever the Minister prefers.

I accept this portion of the Senator's amendment, to delete the words "or direction in writing given" in line 21 of Section 9.

That meets me.

In line 19 and lines 20 and 21.

Oh, yes, it appears twice.

Yes, I agree to that.

I withdraw my amendment then.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

It is only fair that I should express my appreciation of the manner in which the Minister has met me. I regard it as a point of principle and I think that it is only right that I should express my appreciation of the Minister's attitude. I take it that the Minister will put down the amendment on the Report Stage.

Yes, I will do that.

I also would like to appreciate the way the Minister has met the situation.

Sections 9 to 15, inclusive, agreed to.
SECTION 16.

I move amendment No. 5:

In sub-section (3), page 8, lines 29 and 30 and in lines 33 and 34 to delete the words and figures "1st day of September, 1947" and substitute therefor the words and figures "31st day of December, 1947".

Last year I raised this question of Acts which must be renewed coming up for renewal at a time when the Dáil and Seanad are both adjourning and we have the same thing here. For no particular reason the expiring date is fixed for the 1st September and we have to rush it through and we will be up against the same problem next year if it is desired, as I am sure it will, to continue this Bill in its present form or in some other form. I am merely proposing that it will continue in force until the 31st of December next so that there will be ample time in the autumn to deal with it.

I rise to oppose this amendment. I cannot see any occasion for postponing the operations of this measure. We only accept these Acts because we have to. Many of us are bitterly opposed to them because they are pressing on industry. I was hoping that it would be possible in a much lesser time than 12 months to remove most of if not all the restrictive measures in this Bill. I sincerely hope, therefore, that the House will not accept this amendment and that at the end of the stated period, it will be found possible not to have a further continuation of the Bill at all.

May I point out that the Senator is entirely wrong in suggesting that I am proposing to extend the life of the Bill?

You are extending it for 15 months instead of for 12.

If the Senator will read the Bill he will find that "the Government may by Order declare that the Act shall expire on any specified date earlier than the 1st September, 1947." If the situation changes in the manner in which the Senator and all of us hope it will change, the Government can bring this Bill to an end on 1st January next year or at any other time during the year 1947. All I am asking is that the continuing Bill, if there has to be a continuing Bill, will not be introduced in the month of July or August next year.

I think I can settle the difficulties of the two Senators. The Government got a lot of powers under the 1939 Act and it got rid of them as quickly as it could—every one of them. It is asking for powers under this Bill which it wants to exercise only for as short a time as possible. Whether this Bill is dated for six months, for two years or 22 years, the same thing will happen in relation to the Orders made under it—the Government will keep them in operation only for as short a time as possible. I agree with Senator Duffy from one point of view. If this Bill or any Bill like it has unfortunately to be renewed, it should be renewed at some other time of the year, so that I shall not have to come to the Seanad instead of the Minister for Industry and Commerce, who is responsible for the Bill. I think it would be better, if the Bill has to be renewed, that that should be done in the autumn. As far as I am concerned, I am prepared to accept Senator Duffy's amendment, at the same time giving Senator Summerfield the assurance that even though the Bill is expressed as giving the Government these powers for an extra four months, that is not going to extend the duration of a single Order by one day further than the Government thinks it necessary to keep it in operation.

Amendment agreed to.
Section 16, as amended, and the Title agreed to.
Bill reported with amendments.
Report Stage ordered for Thursday, 18th July.
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