I propose to take Priority Questions Nos. 11 and 12 and Questions Nos. 50, 56 and 61 together.
The recent decisions of the Supreme Court in the Finucane, Clarke and Carron cases arose from appeals taken in respect of orders for extradition which were made by the District Court under Part III of the Extradition Act, 1965. In reaching those decisions the Supreme Court applied the law to the isssues argued before it on the basis of the facts established in the proceedings. That is the function and indeed the duty of the courts. Under the Constitution the Judiciary are, of course, independent in the exercise of their functions and are pledged to uphold the Constitution and the law.
Our extradition code now comprises three Acts of the Oireachtas — the Extradition Act, 1965, the Extradition (European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism) Act, 1987, and the Extradition (Amendment) Act, 1987. It is important to note that the Extradition (European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism) Act, 1987, did not apply to the three cases in question because the warrants in those cases were issued before the commencement of that Act. However, that Act will apply to any future extradition case in which the warrants which form the basis of the proceedings were issued after 1 December, 1987, the date on which the Act commenced.
The Extradition (European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism) Act, 1987, gives effect in our law to the Council of Europe Convention of that name. The Act implements article 1 of the convention in full and consequently provides that the offences specified in that article shall, for extradition purposes, never be regarded as political offences or offences connected with political offences. The Act also contains special provisions relating to the offences covered by article 2 of the convention, which is an optional article, whereby those offences are not to be regarded as political offences in certain circumstances. In addition, the Act provides that nothing will prevent a determination being made that an offence is not a political offence in circumstances or by reason of considerations other than those referred to in the Act itself.
The provisions of the 1987 Act fully meet the obligations we undertook in signing the Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism and enabled this country to ratify it without recourse to a reservation permitted by Article 13. Article 13 allows contracting States to make reservations in respect of the application of article 1 — in effect to refuse extradition for an offence covered by article 1 which it considers to be a political offence provided certain specified matters have been considered in reaching that decision. Ireland is one of only eight countries to have acceded to the convention without entering a reservation. The remaining 14 parties to the convention — Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Malta, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland — have entered reservations.
In addressing the issues raised by the court decisions to which attention is drawn in these questions, it should be stressed that the 1987 Act has, as yet, not been relied on in any case decided by the courts. That Act is, therefore, untried and assumptions should not be made in regard to what some choose to describe as its limitations.
My comments so far have been largely directed towards those aspects of the recent Supreme Court decisions that concerned the political offence exception. We should not, however, lose sight of the fact that, quite irrespective of the provisions of any legislation governing extradition, neither Mr. Finucane nor Mr. Clarke would have been extradited because the Supreme Court concluded that to have done so would have infringed their constitutional rights. Indeed, in the case of Mr. Clarke no reliance was ultimately placed on the political offence exception and the ground upon which his release was sought and granted was solely that of his constitutional rights. In reaching its conclusion on these issues, the Supreme Court was influenced by the findings of the present Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland in his judgment in a case known as the Pettigrew case, which was a civil action taken against the Northern Ireland Office and the Governor of the Maze Prison by a Maze prisoner arising from events occurring in the aftermath of the 1983 escape.
It is also important to recognise that, apart from extradition, our law provides another method of dealing with fugitive offenders. That is the extra-territorial method whereby, notably under the provisions of the Criminal Law (Jurisdiction) Act, 1976, our courts have jurisdiction to try persons for certain serious offences committed in Northern Ireland and, in certain circumstances, elsewhere. The Government are committed to the use of both methods to tackle the problem of fugitive offenders in appropriate cases. The Government also believe that there is scope for greater use of the Criminal Law (Jurisdiction) Act, 1976 in such cases.
As the joint statement issued following the meeting of the Anglo-Irish Inter-governmental Conference in London on 19 April records, officials were instructed to undertake a review of the situation pertaining to arrangements for dealing with fugitive offenders and to report back to a future meeting of the conference. That review will not be confined solely to extradition but will also cover the possibilities afforded by the Criminal Law (Jurisdiction) Act, 1976. My Department will, of course, be participating in that review. When that review has been completed, the matter will be looked at again in the intergovernmental conference.