I move:
That Dáil Éireann takes note of the measures taken by the Government controlling and regulating exports to Iran.
Statutory Instruments 145 and 146 of 1980 which have been laid before this House enable exports to Iran to be controlled and regulated. The issue of these Orders followed on a decision of the nine member states of the European Community to impose limited trade and diplomatic sanctions on Iran.
The chain of events which led up to that decision of the Nine may be said to have begun on 4 November last when demonstrators led by militant students occupied the US embassy compound in Tehran and took captive over fifty members of the embassy staff. The seizure of the embassy was one incident in a long period of instability which included frequent mass demonstrations in Tehran and other cities, fighting between the armed forces and factions opposed to the Shah, the departure of the Shah and the return from exile of Ayatollah Khomeini, one of the spiritual leaders of the Shia Moslem community which is the predominant religious faith in Iran. More recently, there has been the execution of many highly placed officials and military officers of the Shah's regime and the growth of tension between Iran and neighbouring countries, particularly in the Gulf area. It is clear that in the last two years Iran has passed through a traumatic period. An elected assembly is now meeting, for the first time in many years, and we can predict that its decisions will be of fundamental importance for the future development of Iran.
Ireland and the other member states of the European Community have followed these developments with great interest. While the Nine have expressed concern over the frequent executions, it is neither our intention nor indeed our right to challenge the free choice of the Iranian people in regard to the form of Government and institutions under which they choose to live. These are matters which they must determine for themselves, and we accept that fully. The European Council in their statement of 30 November 1979 made it clear that the Nine Community member states fully respect the independence of Iran and the right of the Iranian people to determine their own future, and are aware of the importance which the Iranian people attach to the changes which have taken place in their country.
The students who took captive the staff of the US embassy claimed that they intend to hold them as hostages for the return of the Shah and of assets which he and members of his family had removed from Iran illegally, or acquired abroad with funds taken out of the country illegally.
It is not my intention to go into the matters at issue between the US and the Iranian authorities in regard to events during the Shah's regime, or the matters alleged by the students. The specific point at issue in the discussion about sanctions has been the holding as hostages of diplomatic personnel, properly accredited, whom it is the duty of the host country under international law to protect. The European Council characterised the holding of the, hostages as a flagrant breach of international law.
That the Iranian authorities have failed to act in accordance with their clear obligations under international law is evident from the fact that no effort has been made to remove the hostages from the control of those who hold them and to set them at liberty. The Revolutionary Council, which was the de facto authority in the country prior to the election of an assembly, in fact refused to accept responsibility for the hostages. The newly elected Assembly has not to date deliberated on the hostages issue and there is no evidence that it intends to take it up with any urgency.
The United States administration for its part has made it clear that it considers the holding of the hostages and the whereabouts of the Shah to be separate and unrelated questions. The United States has tried to avail of such means of recourse as are open to it at the international level. It has taken the matter up both in the International Court of Justice and in the United Nations Security Council. It has also tried to use various channels of mediation.
On 29 November 1979 the United States instituted proceedings in the International Court of Justice against Iran, seeking an order to the Government of Iran to release the hostages and return US property. The Iranian authorities declined to appear, arguing that the holding of the hostages should not be dissociated from its proper context, namely, the whole relationship between Iran and the US over the last 25 years, and that matters arising out of the Islamic revolution of Iran fell within the national sovereignty of Iran. In its judgment given on 24 May the court rejected this argument and pointed out that if Iran believed it had legitimate grievances against the US it was free to bring these before the court, by way of counter-claim or otherwise; however, Iran, by refusing to appear, had deprived itself of the opportunity to make its case before the court and seek redress. The court pointed out that there is an obligation, long established in international law, on receiving States to protect diplomatic personnel and premises. Islam had itself contributed to the development of international law on this subject. These obligations remain in the event of the breaking off of diplomatic relations or even of war between states. The court also pointed out that states are not obliged to maintain diplomatic relations, but those which do are obliged to respect the norms of international law governing them.
The matter of the hostages was also considered in the United Nations Security Council. On 25 November 1979 the Secretary-General wrote to the Security Council describing the holding of the hostages as a grave situation posing a serious threat to international peace and security. The Security Council on 4 December 1979 expressed deep concern at the dangerous level of tension between Iran and the US, which could have grave consequences for international peace and security. It reaffirmed the solemn obligation on all states that were parties to the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations to respect the inviolability of diplomatic personnel and premises. It called on the Government of Iran to release the personnel of the US Embassy, afford them protection and allow them to leave Iran. It asked the Secretary-General to use his good offices for the immediate implementation of the resolution.
The Security Council considered the hostage question again on 31 December 1979 and decided, in the event of non-compliance with its resolution, to adopt effective measures under Articles 39 and 41 of the United Nations Charter. These articles provide, among other things, for the imposition of sanctions.
The Security Council met again on 12 January 1980 to consider the issue of the hostages. At this meeting the US presented a request for sanctions against Iran in certain specified areas, the most notable exclusions being foodstuffs and medicines. Despite the absence of any improvement in the situation and the commitment to action in the Security Council's Resolution of 31 December 1979, the Soviet Union voted against the imposition of sanctions, thus frustrating the earlier unanimous decision.
The US has also had recourse to mediation. In the early days of the hostages' captivity President Carter sent personal envoys to Iran, but they did not complete the journey when it was made clear that they would not be allowed to meet Iranian government officials or the hostages themselves.
The Secretary-General in the exercise of the "good offices" function entrusted to him by the Security Council, remained in contact with the parties to the dispute and on 19 February 1980 nominated a Commission of Inquiry comprising five members, eminent lawyers or diplomats from Algeria, France, Sri Lanka, Syria and Venezuela. The mandate of the commission was "to undertake a fact-finding mission to Tehran to hear Iran's grievances and allow an early solution to the crisis between Iran and the United States". Initially it appeared that the commission would be able to play an important part in resolving the problem. They travelled to Tehran and heard evidence, from the students holding the hostages and others, of injustices under the Shah's regime and of alleged US involvement. After the commission had completed their investigation into Iran's grievances the students holding the hostages offered to turn them over to the Revolutionary Council. The council refused to accept responsibility for them. The commission was unable to gain access to the hostages. The members of the commission left Tehran on 10 March and later informed the Secretary-General that they had been unable to carry out their mandate fully and were not in a position to submit a report.
At this point it may have appeared to the US that all the normal avenues of recourse had been tried and had failed. There had often seemed to be grounds for hope that a solution would soon be found, but each time the hopes had been disappointed and the efforts bedevilled by the absence of an effective central authority in Iran, and in the last analysis by an absence of political will on the part of the Iranian authorities.
However, the US decided to proceed with the imposition of sanctions against Iran on the basis of the draft Security Council Resolution which had been vetoed. On 1 April President Bani Sadr of Iran held out the prospect that the hostages would be transferred to government custody and the US deferred the application of sanctions. President Bani Sadr's statement came to nothing. On 7 April Ayatollah Khomeini stated that the situation of the hostages was unchanged and that the students would continue to hold them. The US then broke off diplomatic relations with Iran and imposed economic sanctions. The US also appealed to a number of West European and other countries including the member states of the Community to join in the imposition of sanctions on the basis of the vetoed Security Council Resolution.
The Nine had followed the hostages situation with the utmost concern from its earliest days. I have referred already to the position taken by the European Council on 30 November 1979. In the months following 4 November, the heads of mission of the Nine in Tehran, first under the Irish presidency and later under that of Italy, were in regular contact with the Iranian authorities with a view to bringing about improvements in the conditions in which the hostages were held, and their eventual release.
These messages did not unfortunately produce any change in the situation. The Foreign Ministers of the Nine met in Lisbon on 10 April and decided to instruct their representatives in Tehran to approach President Bani Sadr immediately and request the release of the hostages and details of the timing and manner of the release. The heads of mission were instructed to report back to capitals on the reaction to their request. The Foreign Ministers stated that they would study their positions in the light of the reports they received. The approach was made and the heads of mission, including the Irish Chargé d'Affaires, reported in person to their respective capitals.
At their next meeting, on 22 April 1980 in Luxembourg, the Foreign Ministers again discussed the hostages question. They noted that, while the International Committee of the Red Cross had been permitted to visit the hostages and President Bani Sadr had given assurances about their living conditions, no commitment had been forthcoming in regard to their release. They were concerned that the continuance of this situation was intolerable from a humanitarian and legal point of view, and would endanger international peace and security. They accordingly decided to take certain measures at once against Iran. These included reduction of Embassy staffs in Tehran, introduction of a visa requirement for Iranian nationals and withholding of arms or defence-related equipment. They agreed that if by 17 May, the date of their next meeting, there had been no decisive progress leading to the release of the hostages they would proceed to the application of sanctions on the basis of the vetoed Security Council resolution. The heads of mission in Tehran were instructed to inform the Iranian authorities of this decision.
The European Council, meeting on 27-28 April, described the continued holding of the hostages as an inadmissible violation of international law. They reaffirmed their solidarity with the government and people of the US in this difficult situation. They endorsed the decision of the Foreign Ministers and expressed support for the efforts of the Secretary General of the United Nations to bring about a resolution of the problem.
The Foreign Ministers met again on 17-18 May in Naples. They acknowledged that since the date of their last meeting there had been no progress towards the release of the hostages. They decided to impose sanctions against Iran on the basis already agreed. They stressed that the only purpose of these measures was to hasten the release of the hostages and that they wished to respect the independence of Iran and the right of the Iranian people to determine their own future.
To sum up, our view is that the position created by the taking of the hostages is of concern to all states, since the violation of international law which it involves touches on the rights and interests of all. Whatever Iran's grievances, it is clear that channels of recourse are open to it, and they do not justify the taking of diplomatic personnel as hostages. This is not only a very serious breach of international law, but a continuing one which the Iranian authorities have to date shown no disposition to remedy. Iran is flouting the laws by which relations between states are governed. To that extent it can be said to have put itself outside the normal operation of these relations. The Nine have tried to point out to the Iranians the seriousness of their action. We have given them time in which to consider our appeals. The International Court of Justice and the Security Council have also given their judgments. All this has been to no avail. We have accordingly taken a step which we hope will bring home to Iran the unacceptability of the course in which it is engaged and contribute to efforts by peaceful means to bring it to reconsider its actions.
Given the danger to the lives and wellbeing of the hostages and the dilatory approach of the Iranian authorities, the intensity of feeling which led the US to decide that a mission should be undertaken to rescue the hostages is understandable. However, we and our partners in the Nine have expressed the hope that the US will continue to use peaceful means for the release of the hostages so as not to incur the danger of international conflict. It was in the hope of contributing to pressure on Iran through peaceful means that we agreed on the imposition of sanctions, to which the Security Council was in principle committed, and it is in that hope that we are implementing them.
At a time when we are striving to increase our exports it is not lightly that we take measures to restrict Irish exports to a specific country. We consider, however, that in this case the extreme gravity of the situation justifies our action. I hope that the need for these extraordinary measures and for the orders which have been laid before this House will rapidly disappear.